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Abstract
I study whether South African farm households participating in a land reform program make Pareto
efficient intrahousehold consumption decisions. Using evaluation survey data of beneficiary households
participating in South Africa’s Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program, I
estimate and test the unitary and collective models of intrahousehold resource allocation. By estimating
the households’ demand function’s responses to the size of land grant transfers going to resident men
and women, I find evidence rejecting the income pooling hypothesis of the unitary model. On the other
hand, I cannot reject the hypothesis that resource allocation is Pareto efficient, satisfying the test of the
collective model. An alternative test of the collective model using the z-conditional demand approach
proposed by Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) also favours Pareto efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Understanding household decision making is a key issue for economists and policymakers seeking to empower
women within the developing world. This is particularly the case when designing cash or asset transfer
programs that aim to improve the status of women by making them direct program recipients. Without a
clear understanding of power dynamics within the home, the impact of these polices might be mitigated or
produce unintended consequences for other family members.
Traditionally, economists ignored these issues by assuming households behaved as if they are monolithic
entities, with individual preferences set aside and all resources pooled to then channeled towards a common
goal. In this characterisation (known as the unitary model) household spending decisions are not swayed
by the identity of a resource contributor: any benefit from controlling a resource is relinquished when the
resource is added to the family’s common pool. However, an overwhelming body of research has shown that
households often violate this prediction, with household consumption patterns being sensitive to changes in
who contributes what to the family (Thomas, 1990; Shultz, 1990; Duflo, 2003; Bobonis, 2009).
This has motivated the development of intrahousehold allocation theories which emphasise the role of
individual bargaining power within the decision making process. One such class of models - known as the
collective approach1 - do not explicitly characterise mechanisms of the decision making process besides
assuming that the final allocation of resources is Pareto efficient, in that a reallocation would not improve the
welfare of one member without making another worse off (Chiappori, 1992). Another class of models - known
as non-cooperative models - predict that allocations might not be inefficient when household environments
are unstable, or when information asymmetries exist between household members (Lundberg & Pollack, 1993,
2003; Bloch & Rao, 2002).
Whether household resource allocations are Pareto efficient is an empirical question. On the one hand, a
number of studies from both developed and developing countries have failed to reject the hypothesis that
household resources are allocated efficiently (Browning et al., 1994; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Bobonis,
2009). On the other hand, studies focusing on the efficiency of agricultural productivity of rural West African
farm households have shown that households are not efficient in their production (Udry, 1996; Duflo & Udry,
2004). This is a striking result, as it indicates that in a highly resource constrained context, husbands and
wives are systematically unable to to achieve efficient resource outcomes.
1Alternatively described as cooperative models (Alderman et al., 1995).
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In this thesis, I propose and then implement a quasi-experiment to determine whether the predictions of
the unitary and collective models hold for South African farm households who participated in the Land
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program. This land reform program, which was active
from 2001 until being phased out by 2012, provided land grants to landless black farmers and farm tenants
for the purpose of purchasing agricultural land. Rather than mandating the redistribution of farmland, the
program worked through state assisted market transfers on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis. A key feature
of the program was that it permitted multiple members of the same household to apply individually for
land grants, which resulted in a large share of female household members receiving transfers. Because of
maximum limits on individual grants, LRAD applicants would typically pool grants with others in order to
purchase larger farms to be owned in common. This produced co-ownership schemes involving both men
and women within the same household. However, it is unclear whether the acquisition of rights in land by
female household members resulted in a substantive change in their capacity to affect household expenditure
decisions (thus violating the unitary model) and whether efficient spending patterns were maintained as rights
in land were reallocated across men and women within households (as the collective model would predict).
The theoretical framework developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon et al. (2009), and Cheryche et
al. (2011), among others, offers a series of useful tests of the unitary and collective models. The advantage of
these tests is that they do not require the observation of individual demand behaviour. Instead, they are based
on the responses of household level demand to changes in what are termed distribution factors: variables that
only alter consumption patterns by shifting the relative bargaining power between decision makers. I will
argue that LRAD’s grant transfers to men and women are appropriate candidates for distribution factors.
Assuming that consumption preferences are heterogeneous between men and women, both models place
different restrictions on the way household consumption can respond to separate variation in distribution
factors. A key prediction of the unitary model is what is known as the income pooling hypothesis, requiring
that household expenditure decisions are equally responsive to changes in male and female distribution
factors. Where the income pooling hypothesis is rejected, the unitary model cannot hold. With regards to
the collective model, the efficiency requirement gives rise to what is known as the proportionality condition,
where the ratio of the responses of household demand to changes in each genders’ distribution factor should
be equal across all goods. A test for the proportionality condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the collective model (Chiappori, 1998).
The identifying assumptions required by the proportionality condition are hard to satisfy. An ideal research
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design would randomly assign land grants to men and women within households. Following this ideal
design, I instead use quasi-experimental data on LRAD grant applicants and recipients to construct plausible
distribution factors. The data comes from a cross-sectional evaluation survey conducted by the Department
of Land Affairs (DLA) between 2005 and 2007, which collected demographic, consumption and program
relevant information on LRAD participating households. A key feature of the data is the fact that the survey
sample included households who had received grant transfer, as well as those still in the application pipeline.
For both groups, the survey collected information on each grant applicant within the household, including
their gender and the size of the applied for grant. Using this data, it is possible to determine the total value
of the grants applied for by men and by women within each household.
To deal with the potential endogeneity of these two variables, my identification strategy relies on features of
the LRAD implementation process. Following Keswell & Carter (2014), I argue that, due to random delays in
the application process, and a homogeneous application pool (generated by self-selection into the program and
a stringent filtering-out of weaker applicants), whether a household had received grant transfer at the time
of the survey interview was largely independent of household preferences. After controlling for observable
differences in application date, as well as other application-relevant household characteristics, a household’s
‘post-transfer’ status is sufficiently exogenous. Relying on this, I construct distribution factors by interacting
an post-transfer indicator with the total value of land grants applied for by each gender in the household. I
argue that, conditional on the total grant amount applied for by men and women, the estimated coefficients
on these interaction terms capture the (exogenous) transfer effect of men and women’s land grants.2
Using variation in these two factors, I test whether household members’ resource allocation decisions support
unitary rationality, and whether they are Pareto efficient. Including the above distribution factors in a
demand system for food and non-food goods, I test the restrictions of the collective and unitary model. My
results reject the income pooling hypothesis, thus providing evidence that South African farm households do
not behave in accordance with the unitary model. On the other hand, my tests provide no evidence that
households are inefficient: i.e., the tests fail to reject that the ratio of distribution factor effects is equivalent
across all consumption goods considered. Therefore, this evidence favours the collective rationality approach.
While separate variation in the land grant amount will alter consumption decisions differently depending
on the recipient of the transfer, this does not prohibit the household from efficiently allocating resources
amongst family members.
2The following identification strategy is similar in spirit to studies such as Pitt and Khandker (1998), who a solve a similar
identification issue while evaluating microcredit programs by surveying levels of borrowing for households both in eligible and
ineligible villages. Here, eligibility is analogous to post transfer status.
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To ensure that my results are valid, I conduct an alternative test for collective rationally as developed by
Bourguignon et al. (2009) termed the z-conditional demand system approach, that permits a linear test of
the proportionality condition.3 Accepting the additional assumption that at least one distribution factor has
a monotonic influence on one of the consumption goods (I find evidence that this is the case for healthcare),
it is possible invert the demand system on that distribution factor to develop a system of conditional demand
functions that are a function of household expenditure, preferences, the good that is monotonic in one of the
distribution factors, and the remaining distribution factor. Bourguignon et al. (2009) show that a linear
test of the coefficient estimates on the remaining distribution factor being equal to zero for all goods is an
equivalent test of the proportionality condition. The reasoning is that, if household allocation is Pareto
efficient, the conditioned good should control for all information related to the movement of the household
along the efficiency frontier (Bobonis, 2009). Therefore, the remaining distribution factor should be irrelevant.
I conduct this test and demonstrate that the collective model’s predictions still hold for the demand system
using this more robust approach.
In addition to taking another step towards understanding intrahousehold bargaining between men and women
in rural South Africa, this thesis also contributes to the literature on the microeconomic impacts of property
rights transfers in the developing world. Studies have shown that the transfer of land rights have an impact on
a variety of household decisions, including labour supply (Field, 2007; Wang, 2012), investments (Goldstein
and Udry, 2008), fertility (Field, 2004), and expenditure (Keswell & Carter, 2014). However, the majority
of these studies focus on property transfers to the household as if it is a single entity. In reality, transfer
effects might be dependant on who acquires ownership of the land asset. For example, in South Africa and
other developing countries property is often held in the name of the household head (Deere and Leon, 2001;
Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Wang, 2014). As most household heads tend to be men, policy design that
is not adequately cognisant of intrahoushold dynamics may produce unintended consequences to household
gender inequality.
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. In section two, I present a review of the literature on
intrahousehold models. In section three, I present a theoretical framework in which I formally set out the
unitary and collective modes, and derive a series of tests for each. In section four, I present a summary of
LRAD and the land reform evaluation data. In section five, I discuss the distribution factors. In section six, I
discuss the methodological challenges that arise when attempting to estimate the demand system for low
income farming households. In section seven, I present my estimates of several specifications of the household
3This is to address the concern that nonlinear Wald tests, upon which the proportionality test relies, are not invariant to
restatements of the null hypothesis and thus tend to over reject the null (Bourguignon et al. (2009).
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demand system, along with my results for the tests of the income pooling hypothesis and the proportionality
condition. Section eight concludes.
2 Models of Intrahousehold Allocation
2.1 The unitary model
For a long time, economists analysing household behaviour would treat the household as an individual agent,
maximising a single utility function based on a single set of preferences and a single budget constraint defined
by pooled household incomes (Chiappori, 1992). This unitary approach is convenient as it allowed any
formal theory relating to individual decision making to be directly applied to the household (Chiappori 1992;
Samuelson 1956). However, this came at the expense of ignoring the different preferences and behaviours of
the individuals that made up the household, running against the methodological individualism at the heart
of microeconomic theory (Donni & Ponthieux, 2012).
Several explanations have been used to justify the treatment of household behaviour as individual behaviour.
One such justification is based on a Dictatorial model of the household, assuming that all household decisions
are made by a single head. The dictator - presumably the pater familiar of the traditional household (Deaton,
1997) - has supreme power over other family members. Because other members have no say in the household’s
decision making, their individual preferences and utility functions are not relevant. Thus, the household’s
behaviour depends solely on maximising the single utility function of the dictator (Chiappori, 1997). This
justification is reliant on the assumption that all other members have no bargaining power. While this might
apply to the households of certain societies, perhaps those with strong patriarchal norms, it is unlikely to be
applicable across all contexts (Deaton, 1997).
Another justification is offered by Samuelson (1956) in the Consensus Principle approach. In this explanation,
the household acts as if it is a unitary entity because members precommit to a single household welfare
function that is an increasing in terms of all member’s utility functions. Thus, as household members work to
maximise the objective function, the household behaves as if it is maximising a single utility function. The
advantage in this is that it explains the household’s behaviour in terms of individual preferences. However,
this approach does not account for how the members agree upon the common objective function, which would
require a harmonisation of conflicting interests in many cases (Haddad et al., 1997).
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The third and most rigorously argued justification for the unitary approach is developed by Becker (1971,
1991) in his altruism model and Rotten Kid Theorem. In his model of the household, Becker assumes that the
household is made up of a household head who is altruistic, deriving utility from other household members
consumption. Other members (the head’s spouse and children) are egoistic, deriving utility only from their
own consumption. With these assumptions, given sufficient wealth and altruism, the household head is
incentivised to transfer resources to the other members. The critical implication is that any changes in the
distribution of resources would not affect each members consumption levels, as the head would adjust the
transfers to each member in order to maximise their utility (Chiappori, 1997). Because of these transfers,
the total resources allocated to each member is an increasing function of total household resources. Thus,
all non-head members are motivated to work towards maximising total household resources, rather than
behaving rottenly, and results in all household members maximising the household head’s utility function
(Alderman et al., 1995; Donni & Ponthieux, 2012).
Within this model, Becker argues, the presence of an altruistic head provides sufficient justification for unitary
behaviour even in the absence of the head having dictatorial power (Chiappori, 1997). All that is required
is that each egoistic household member is capable of considering how their actions will impact the total
household’s resources (Donni & Ponthieux, 2012). However, several theorists have shown that the Rotten
Kid Theorem only holds under highly restrictive conditions. Bergstrom (1989) demonstrates several cases
where the head’s transfer is independent of their income allocation. He points out that it is necessary for the
head to be able to pre-commit to an allocation procedure. Additionally, Ben-Porath (1982) and Pollak (1985)
argue that it is not sufficient for the head to be altruistic, they must also possess a certain amount of control
over the distribution of resources. Thus, the distribution of power will necessarily play a role in determining
household behaviour.
In addition to these theoretical difficulties, the unitary model has been contradicted by a growing number
of empirical studies. The assumptions of the unitary model place a number of restrictions on the way that
a unitary household can behave, the violations of which can be tested empirically. One prediction of the
unitary model is that the restrictions placed on the household demand functions should result in the Slutsky
matrix being negative semidefinite and symmetric (Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017). A number of papers have
tested and rejected this condition, including Lewbel (1995), Browning and Chiappori (1998), Dauphin and
Fortin (2001), and Dauphin et al. (2011). However, this test is relatively demanding, requiring price variation
to be observed over time and additional assumptions including exogenous price variation and separability
(Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017).
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The more popular test of the unitary model is that which relies on the income-pooling hypothesis. This is
based on the model’s implication that the allocation of resources among household members should not affect
total household consumption. For example, a simultaneous increase in a husband’s income and equivalent
decrease in a wife’s income, should have no impact on household expenses. In other words, the unitary
household acts as if resources are first pooled together, and then allocated irrespective of the income’s sources
(Alderman et al., 2015). The test requires an estimation of the households demand functions for a series of
goods, seeing whether demand responses are the same across different member’s resources. One of the test’s
appealing features is that the can be conducted without observed variation in prices (Chiappori & Mazzocco,
2017). Nor do individual consumption levels need to be observed, only aggregate household expenditure
levels across several goods categories, so long as preferences for the goods differ across household members
(Alderman et al., 1995).
Many studies that have tested and rejected the unitary model via the income-pooling hypothesis (Schultz,
1990; Thomas, 1990; Bourguignon et al., 1993; Fortin & Lacroix, 1997; Lundberg, Pollak, & Wales, 1997;
Phipps & Burton, 1998; Attanasio & Lechene, 2002; Ward-Batts, 2008). By 1995 it was argued by Alderman et
al. (1995) that it was ‘time to shift the burden of proof’, on the basis that the evidence was so overwhelmingly
against the unitary model to require that anyone using this approach first justify why it was appropriate to
apply to a particular context. Due to the weak theoretical foundations of the unitary model and contradictory
empirical evidence, economists have sought to develop alternative models of intrahousehold allocation that
can account for differing preferences and power relations amongst members of the household.
2.2 The collective model
As an alternative to the unitary approach, the collective approach was developed in a series of papers by
Chiappori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992) and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This
approach is a generalisation of a number of non-unitary models, all with a common testable assumption -
that the bargaining process produces efficient allocations of resources between members. In other words,
keeping total household resources constant, the wellbeing of one household member cannot be increased by
reallocating resources without lowering the wellbeing of another household member (Alderman et al., 1995).
Several arguments exist to justify this assumption, but the one most commonly advanced has its basis in game
theory, arguing that efficient allocations of resources amongst individuals will emerge spontaneously when
interactions are repeated in a stationary environment, which results in the members exhausting the efficiency
enhancing possibilities (Alderman et al., 1995). Proponents argue that a marriage, or any stable household,
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can be considered such a stationary environment (Donni & Ponthieux, 2012). Moreover, the assumption
of efficiency is a straightforward way to extend rationality of individuals as developed in consumer theory
to groups, thus the approach is often described as a model of collective rationality (Browning & Chiappori
1998).
While the allocation of resources is presumed to be efficient, the collective approach makes no assumption
about the final distribution of the resources. This is the case in a simple illustration of the model where two
spouses, both income earners, collectively bargain on how to spend their total household budget (Alderman
et al., 1995). They first decide how much to spend on public goods (which both can enjoy) after which the
residual is allocated between each member’s private goods in accordance with what is known as a sharing
rule. The sharing rule is the household’s rule of thumb that determines how much weight is given to one
spouse’s consumption preferences over the other’s (Deaton 1997). This sharing rule is in turn determined by
the relative income earned by each spouse. If the one partner’s income were to increase, relative to the other,
this would shift the sharing rule in favour of their preferences, resulting in a reallocation of resources at a
different, although still efficient, equilibrium (Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017).
The spouses’ relative income in the above example is what is known in the collective approach as a distribution
factor. A distribution factor is any household characteristic that will alter the household consumption patterns
by altering the sharing rule, and not by changing the individual member’s preferences, or the household
budget (Bourgiuignon et al., 2009). This is not limited to relative levels of members’ income. Distribution
factors can be thought of as influencing the members’ bargaining power by adjusting the outside option of the
individual; i.e. their wellbeing if they were to defect from the household (Alderman et al, 1995). Distribution
factors used in research have included land and asset ownership, regional sex-ratios (which might determine
future marriage prospects), divorce laws and the relative size of the spouses’ familial networks (Bourguignon
et al., 2009; Browning et al., 1994; Chiappori & Ekeland, 2009; Attanasio & Lechene, 2014).
The collective approach presents several advantages over the unitary model. A key feature is that, besides the
efficiency assumption, the rules that determine how the household allocates resources are not assumed, unlike
in the justifications of the unitary model. Rather, they emerge from the data. And thus, the assumptions of
the collective approach are sufficient to generate testable restrictions and (with sufficient data) recover key
structural features such as the sharing rule (Deaton, 1997; Bourguignon et al., 2009).
The primary testable restriction of the collective model is known as the proportionality condition. Because
the distribution factors only affect demand through the sharing rule, the ratio of the responses of demands
10
functions to shifts in the distribution factors must be equal to the ratio of the distribution factors effects
on the sharing rule. As a result, all ratios of the partial derivatives of the consumption goods responses to
the distribution factors should all be equal. Hence, the whether or not this condition holds can be tested if
one is able to observe the consumption of at least two goods, and two distribution factors (Bourguignon et
al., 2009; Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017). Using the proportionality condition test, several researchers have
tested the collective model using different data and have been unable to reject it (Bourguignon et al., 1993;
Browning et al., 1994; Browning & Chiappori, 1998; Donni, 2007; Bobonis 2009; Bourguignon, Browning, &
Chiappori, 2009; Attanasio & Lechene, 2014). Another useful feature of the efficiency hypothesis is that it is
also a nested restriction of the unitary model (Deaton 1997), and thus the proportionality condition can also
be used to test the unitary model.
The proportionality condition relies on the assumption that distribution factors only influence household
consumption through the sharing rule, independent of household preferences (Alderman et al., 1995; Deaton,
1997). As with empirical tests of the income pooling hypothesis, this makes it critical that the distribution
factors are exogenous to the household characteristics (Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017). If this is not the
case, it is possible that the differences in distribution factors might simply capture differences in taste across
households. This is arguably the biggest practical challenge when testing the collective model. Because of
this, many tests seek to identify natural experiments that alter proxies of bargaining power independently
of household preferences, such as Attanasio and Lechene (2014) and Bobonis (2009) who make use of the
randomised rollout of the Mexican cash transfer program PROGRESA, which gave cash grants to women in
low income households. Other tests make use of changes in aggregated variables that are determined at a
societal or market level, such as the sex-ratio or changes to marriage laws (Chiappori, Fortin, & Lacroix,
2002).
A second test of the collective approach relies critically on the restrictions imposed on the Slutsky matrix,
requiring that the impact of the distribution factors must not exceed size one (Chiappori & Ekeland, 2006).
Similar to the Slutsky conditions of the unitary model, this test requires panel data with observable price
changes and a series of additional assumptions to be accepted. Moreover, rank condition tests have poor
statistical power in small sample contexts (Cambda-Mendez & Kapetanios, 2009). These restrictions have
resulted in the test being less commonly used in the empirical literature.4
Besides the efficient allocation of consumption goods, the unitary and collective models also place restrictions
4A third test developed by Bourguignon et al. (2009) termed the z-conditional demand approach, which reduces the
proportionality condition to a test of single equation exclusion restrictions, will be presented later in more technical detail.
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on the allocation of each household members’ time to labour supply, household production and leisure
(Chiappori, 1992). Whereas the unitary model operates as if the household member’s total available time is
first ‘pooled’, and then allocated in a way that maximises a common utility function, the collective model is
compatible with a process whereby an individual’s time is efficiently allocated in terms of the household’s
sharing rule, based in turn on the individual’s relative power to influence household decision making (Alderman
et al., 1995; Doss, 2013). This means that when time use of household members is observable (this is commonly
achieved with data from time use surveys) the income-pooling and proportionality condition tests can be
conducted. Research that has used this method, such as Del Boca and Flinn (2012, 2014) for the United
States, Vermeulen et al. (2006) for the Netherlands, and Dubois and Ligon (2011) for the Philippines, tend
to reject the unitary model, but favour efficiency.
The collective model has also been extended to household production dynamics by Udry (1996), Apps and
Rees (1997), Chiappori (1997) and Donni (2008). This is particularly useful when testing the efficiency of
agricultural households, such as families engaged in subsistence farming in developing countries (Duflo & Udry,
2004; Chiappori & Mazzocco, 2017). In this extension, where households engage both in the consumption
and production of different goods, the collective model requires that the inputs to household production is
also allocated efficiently. Udry (1996) first developed a test based on this requirement and conducted it for
farming households in rural Burkina Faso, where men and women tend separate plots of land. Productive
efficiency requires that similarly productive plots should be equal in yield and input allocations, but Udry
observed that the gender of the plot’s owner predicted labour and fertiliser inputs, as well as plot yield. On
this basis, Udry was able to reject both the unitary and collective model in this setting.5
Besides the collective approach, another broad category of models, known as non-cooperative models, have
also been developed in response to the shortfalls of the unitary framework. Unlike the collective approach,
these models do not assume that the household reaches efficient allocation in production and consumption
(Alderman et al., 1995). This framework is developed specifically for settings where individuals cannot enter
into binding commitments with the other members of the household (Ulph, 1988; Carter & Katz, 1992;
Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). Rather, each individual’s actions are conditional on the behaviour of other
members. This is modelled using Cournot-Nash equilibria, where individuals seek to maximise their own
utility subject to their own budget constraint, taking other member’s behaviour as given (Chiappori & Donni,
2009). This framework will lead to resource allocations that are not necessarily efficient.
5The divergence in these results from the rest of the literature may arise for a variety of reasons: because of different norms,
the independence of household resources, or because researchers use different measures to asses the collective decision making
model (Bobonis, 2009; Rangel & Thomas, 2012).
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The non-cooperative approach has several drawbacks. The approach requires a more fully structured model
of how household’s reach allocation decisions. Traditional formulations have required the assumption that
household members adhere to traditional gender roles in terms of the division of labour to household
production and the labour supply (Cherchye, De Rock, & Vermeulen, 2009). Practically, variation in price
data is required for both the public and private goods (Cherchye, De Rock, & Vermeulen, 2010). As the
limitation of data in many contexts prevents this more comprehensive approach, the collective approach is
more widely utilised.
2.3 Evidence from developing countries
While the majority of empirical testing of intrahousehold behaviour has been conducted in developed countries,
a body of evidence is emerging for the developing world. The unitary model has been rejected by researchers
in a variety of settings, including Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) for Côte d’Ivore, Goldstein and Udry (2008)
for Ghana and Bobonis (2009) for Mexico. On the other hand, tests for the collective rationality produce
varied results. Studies that have test the collective model via the proportionality condition, including Thomas
and Chen (1994) for Taiwan and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) for Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia and
South Africa, Duflo and Udry (2004) for Côte d’Ivoire and Dubois and Ligon (2011) for the Philippines,
tend to fail to reject the collective model. However, studies based on production have rejected efficiency.
Udry (1996) for Burkina Faso and Goldstein and Udry (2008) for Ghana reject the collective model when
testing for efficiency in the allocation of inputs household production. Dauphin et al. (2015) reject efficiency
when considering bigamous households in Burkina Faso.This variation in results demonstrates the need for a
wider testing of intrahousehold models in developing countries in order to capture differences in household
behaviour across a range of cultures and institutional backgrounds (Bargain, Kwenda & Ntuli, 2017).
The discussion so far may give the impression that the economic analysis of household decision making is
primarily of academic interest, but the literature has important implications for policy-making, particularly
in the developing world. Firstly, the understanding of intrahousehold resource allocation between members of
a household has important implications on how poverty and inequality is measured (Alderman et al., 1995).
If resources are equally distributed, measuring poverty or inequality at the household level versus individual
level would produce the same result. The evidence has overwhelmingly shown that this is not widely the case.
If the efficiency assumption of the collective model is deemed appropriate, the model can be used to calculate
the household sharing rules, which can then be used to estimate poverty rates for individual household
members (Deaton 1997; Bargain, Kwenda & Ntuli, 2017). Moreover, collective models offer the ability to
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analyse gender inequality within the household, as well as other forms of discrimination against vulnerable
household members (e.g. children, the elderly). In the African context, research has shown evidence of
spending discrimination in favour of boys in Malawi (Dunbar et al., 2013) but no difference in expenditure on
boys versus girls in Côte d’Ivoire (Bargain et al., 2014).
The underlying household decision making process is also important in understanding the impact of public
transfer schemes such as pensions, cash grants and land titling programs. While the unitary model predicts
that the identity of the recipient is not important, many of the cited studies have shown that this is not the
case. If incomes are not pooled, then the preferences of the recipient will affect the expenditure (Alderman et
al., 1995). Many studies in the developing countries have suggested that women tend to spend more income
on child care and food (Alderman et al., 1995; Doss, 2013). Evidence from randomised roll outs of cash
transfers have shown that increases in women’s income from the transfer greatly increases child education,
nutrition, heights and survival rates, relative to comparable increases in men’s income (Behrman & Hoddinott,
2005; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Bobonis, 2009; Lim et al., 2010). More generally, models of household decision
making need to be considered as this process will determine the impact of the transfer on non-recipient
household members, as this process may mitigate or enhance the impact of the transfer (Alderman et al.,
1995).
2.3.1 South Africa
A small literature has emerged testing household models for South Africa. For the most part, the consensus
rejects the unitary model. Duflo (2003) tests the unitary model in the context of South Africa’s pension
scheme. She exploits the gender differences in pension eligibility criteria, whereby men become eligible at 65
and women at 60, as a natural experiment. She finds, for households containing cohabiting pensioners, that
the gender of the grant recipient determines the amount spent on a couple’s grandchildren, thus contradicting
the unitary model. Using a more informal approach, Case (2002) investigates income pooling using data
from a survey measuring the health outcomes of pension-receiving households, which also asked whether
respondents pooled resources. The pension was found to have a stronger impact on non-pensioners living in
household’s that reported to pooled resources. However, the generalisation of these results might be limited
by the fact that they are focus on households with in which pensioners reside.
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) use survey data from four countries (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia and
South Africa) to formally test the unitary model, by testing the income-pooling hypothesis, and the collective
model. For South Africa, data on Indian and Black two partner households in KwaZulu-Natal are obtained
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from the 1998 KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS). For both tests, assets owned by each partner
are used as distribution factors. To deal with the potential endogeneity of intrahousehold asset distributions,
each partner’s asset shares are instrumented with lobola payments and other gifts exchanged by families at
marriage, as well as each spouse’s parents education: predictors of the asset distribution at marriage and thus
the initial negotiation of the sharing rule. For South African households, as for the other countries considered,
they reject the unitary model, but fail to reject the test for the collective model. However, the authors note
that their results are weakened by the poor precision of their asset measures and the complexity of South
African households, with many partners not co-residing.
Building on previous work, Maitra and Ray (2006) use the 1998 KIDS data set, along with households
previously interviewed from the 1993 South Africa Integrated Household Survey, to test income pooling
hypothesis for two partner households in KwaZulu-Natal, disaggregating partner income into various sources
(earned income, unearned incomes from asset returns, social pensions and private transfers). To deal with
potential endogeneity of these forms on income, they exploit the panel nature of the data set, and utilise a
3SLS procedure, instrumenting for education and migratory status of adult members. While their outcomes
are sensitive to specifications of the time trend variable, in all specifications, they fail to reject the income
pooling hypothesis for aggregated income and the principal goods considered. Their results differ from most
the other evidence rejecting income pooling for South African households. However, when only unearned
income is considered (both private and public transfers) their results suggest men and women do not pool
their income. In this instance, Maitra and Ray tentatively attribute this to the ‘separate accounts’ explanation
offered by Duflo & Udry (2004), where income from different sources are assigned to different ‘mental accounts’,
which are then reserved for specific types of purchases.6
Wittenberg (2009) uses data from the 2008 time use survey to test the unitary model based on its restrictions
on the allocation of household member’s time use. Using a measure of familial relatedness, he finds that
women who are close relatives of other household members work more and allocate less time to leisure than
female members who are distantly related. The opposite is true for men. Closely related male members work
less and enjoy more leisure than distantly related members. This suggests that closely related men benefit
from the altruism of closely related women, which they use to extract more leisure, whereas women cannot.
This suggests that the identity of the individual contributing their time to the family pool determines how
that time is utilised, thus contradicting the unitary model.
6Wittenberg (2009) points out that Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) and Maitra and Ray (2006) both suffer from the fact
that the sample contains both black African and Indian households, and significant differences in income sources, consumption
and culture between these groups might not be adequately controlled for.
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While the majority of studies on South African household decision making have sought to test the unitary
model, few have sought to test the collective model. Besides Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), Krueser (2009)
is the only other study to test the collective model using South African data. He uses the 2008 wave of the
National Income Dynamics Study to test both the unitary and collective model for black African two-partner
households. Using male and female income shares as distribution factors, he rejects the unitary model for
these households but fails to reject the collective model. He then goes on to use the collective model to
produce structural estimates of the sharing rule. However, the study does little in the way of addressing the
likely endogeneity issues that arise when using partner specific income shares as distribution factors, and so
the test outcomes are not compelling.
Additionally, more structural formulations of the collective model have yet to be widely applied to the South
African data. Such an exercise has been recently attempted by Bargain, Kwenda and Ntuli (2017) for two
partner and single adult households using data from the 2010/2011 Income and Expenditure Survey. They
use a more structured version of the collective mode to estimate the sharing rule for South African households,
as well as produce estimates of gender differentials in welfare and poverty incidence within households. This
paper does not test amongst the unitary and collective models, but relies on the findings of Duflo (2003) and
Krueser (2009), to assume collective rationality, and thus proceed with the structral application of the model.
Several gaps emerge in the South African literature testing intrahousehold models. Firstly, the majority of
studies limit their analysis to two partner households, removing from their samples households with more
than two adult decision makers. This removes the many non-nuclear living arrangements that characterise
South African households (Budlender, 2003; Posel & Rogan, 2011). Secondly, no study as of yet focuses
exclusively on households in a rural context. This is relevant given the likely cultural, institutional and
socio-economic differences between urban and rural-agricultural households. Thirdly, while Quisumbing and
Maluccio (2003) test amongst models using assets brought into the marriage, no study has explored the
intrahousehold distributional effects of land transfer projects by gender. This is an important focus, given
the relative importance of land as an asset for rural sub Saharan African homes (Doss, 2013) and for the
purposes of evaluating the distributional impacts of such programs, which have the explicit mandate to
empower women. This study seeks to fill these gaps in its focus on multi adult rural African households
who are participants in land reform projects. Before undertaking this, in the following section I present a
theoretical model underpinning my analysis.7
7This is a generalised version of the collective model as developed by Chiappori, Browning, Bourguignon and their various
coauthors (1988, 1997, 1998, 2009), and most closely follows Bobonis (2009) and Attanasio & Lechene (2014) in their application
of this framework to an empirical setting.
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3 Theoretical Framework
Consider the case where the household consists of two members, A and B.8 The household can spend its
income on n consumption goods, which each partner’s consumption of good i represented as qAi and qBi and
i = 1, ..., n . The private consumption vectors of these goods are denoted by qA and qB . The total household
private consumption vector is denoted as q = (qA + qB). There is also a vector of m public goods, Q and so
total household consumption is C = (q+Q). The budget constraint is
p′(qA + qB) +P′Q = (p′ +P′)C = y
Where y is total income, or total household expenditure. In the absence of price variation, all prices can
be normalised to one and p is a 1× n vector of normalised prices for private goods, P is a 1×m vector of
normalised prices for public goods. The partners’ utility functions are represented as uA(qA,qB ,Q,a) and
uB(qA,qB ,Q,a), where a is a vector of preference factors a = (aA,aB), which are any variables which act to
directly alter the decision makers’ preferences and tastes. Note that the private consumption of one member
enters the utility function of the other. Following Browning and Chaippori (1998) this is to allow for the
possibility that members are altruistic, but also describes consumption externalities that might occur.
Because individual preferences are not usually identical, there must be a mechanism by which the household
reaches decisions about consumption choices. I present two mechanisms, one that results in the unitary
model, and another that results in the generalised form of the collective model. Going forward, I denote the
demand for good i as ξi when describing the properties that are shared by the demand functions for both
private and public goods.
3.1 Demand functions under the unitary model
One way to construct a unitary model is to assume that households maximise a utility function that is a
weighted sum of individual preferences. The critical assumption is that this weight is fixed. The household’s
8This assumption is not particularly restrictive. Firstly, a fair portion of the sample used in this analysis is composed of
households with only two adults (See table 4). Secondly, the tests that are derived from this assumption can be applied to
households with more than two decision makers (Attanasio & Lechene, 2014; Dauphin et al., 2015). For ease of explanation, I
limit this presentation of household model to nuclear households.
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decision making can be represented as a weighted sum of
max
qA,qB ,Q
θuA(qA,qB ,Q,a) + (1− θ)uB(qA,qB ,Q,a)
subject to p′(qA + qB) +P′Q = (p′ +P′)C = y
(1)
The weight θ gives the influence of partner A’s preferences on the demand for goods and is bounded between
one and zero.9 When θ is fixed, it is the same as if the household operated under the single utility function
U(qA,qB ,Q,a) which will produce demand functions ξi(qA,qB ,Q,a) for i = 1, ..., n.10 The demand system
satisfies the adding up, homogeneity and Slutsky symmetry conditions. When prices vary, the Slutsky matrix
is negative semidefinite.
3.2 Demand functions under the collective model
Under the collective model, the household’s consumption behaviour is collectively rational. This implies that
the allocations to the household members are Pareto efficient. Because of this, the weight θ is not fixed, and
now can be thought of as capturing the sharing rule (this is alternatively termed the Pareto weight in the
literature). Now, the generalised household function can be expressed as:
max
qA,qB ,Q
θ(y,a, z)uA(qA,qB ,Q,a) + [1− θ(y,a, z)]uB(qA,qB ,Q,a)
subject to p′(qA + qB) +P′Q = (p′ +P′)C = y
(2)
The Pareto weight now depends on (y,a, z), where a and y are as defined above, and z are distribution factors,
any variable that influences consumption behaviour, but not by acting through on individual preferences or
the budget constraint. They act on demand solely through the Pareto weight θ.
We can then solve the maximisation problem to create a system of household demand functions
ξi = Ξ(y,a, θ(y,a, z)) ∀i = 1, ..., n (3)
These demand functions are assumed to be trice differential, continuous and homogeneous to degree zero.
While the demand system does not satisfy Sultsky symmetry, the pseudo-Slutsky matrix of price responses is
9Note that this set up of the unitary model captures the specific case of a dictatorial household, where θ = 1 and partner A is
the dictator, or when θ = 0 and person B is the dictator. In these cases, the non-dictator partner’s utility function will fall away
and the household will seek to maximise the dictators utility function.
10This is not the only possible representation of the unitary model, although this form allows it to be related to the collective
model, where θ depends on distribution factors.
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rank one and is equal to the sum of a symmetric matrix (Browning & Chiappori 1998).
Bourguignon et al. (2009) show that this demand system specification constitutes a necessary and sufficient
condition for collective rationality. This condition places a restriction on the functional form of the demand
function so that the distribution factors can only shift the demand for any good through an index that defines
the relative weights for each decision maker. Notice that while preferences and income can be rationalised
within the unitary model, the effect of a distribution factor on demand cannot be rationalised in the unitary
model. Thus, distribution factors serve an essential role in testing for the collective model. In the absence
of distribution factors, only the functional form assumptions can be used for identification, provided price
variation is observed.
If more than one distribution factor is observable, then it is possible conduct a series of tests of the collective
model. In section 3.3 below, I assume that a set of satisfactory distribution factors can be identified. Without
a more structural modelling on how power is determined within the household, the designation of a household
characteristic as a distribution factor, rather than a preference factor, is an identifying assumption and cannot
be tested for. Identifying incontrovertible distribution factors has been a major challenge in the empirical
literature. In section 5, I discuss the identifying assumptions that are made in this analysis in context of
LRAD.
3.3 Testing restrictive assumptions
Without any other assumptions, the framework offers predictions about the consumption behaviour of
households. It is possible to test whether Pareto efficiency holds, and also, whether specific forms of efficiency
are observed, such as the income pooling of the unitary model. Tests for collective rationality differ depending
on the types of data that are available. Here, I focus on tests that require no data on price variation.
Bourguignon et al. (2009) show that from equation 3, two further conditions follow, all of which when tested
are equivalent to testing for collective rationality.
One of these conditions is the proportionality condition. The fact that it follows from the collective demand
system, equation 3, can be illustrated with a set of widely used distribution factor candidates: the respective
member’s income shares, yA and yB . Suppose the household has three sources of exogenous income yA, yB
and income available to both members, φ. In this case, the household maximises its utility subject to total
household income y = yA + yB + φ. If total income is held constant, ξi does not depend on yA, yB, or a,
but it will in general depend on φ .Given this above framework it is possible to write θ as a function of each
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partners income share. If prices are assumed to be invariant, the demand function becomes
ξi(θ, yA, yB , φ) = ξAi [θ(yA, yB , φ)] + ξBi [(1− θ)(yA, yB , φ)]
Holding total income constant, ξi depends on θ, but not on the income shares yA or yB . This qualification
can be expressed by replacing φ with y in the above expression, so that we can consider the effect of varying
yA and yB while keeping y constant (which implies an adjustment of θ), so that
ξi(yA, yB , y) = ξAi [θ(yA, yB , y)] + ξBi [y − θ(yA, yB , φ)]
By writing out the demand functions in this way, we have a powerful framework within which to test the
collective model’s restrictions. From this formulation, we can derive a nested test of both the efficiency
property and the income pooling property. To do this, we examine household demands for the ith commodity,
ξi, change, when we change yA
∂ξi
∂yA
= ∂ξ
A
i
∂θ
∂θ
∂yA
− ∂ξ
B
i
∂θ
∂θ
∂yA
The first term on the left hand side is the change in member A’s demand for good i, in response to a change
in yA and the second term is the change in person Bs demand for the good i, in response to a change in
yA, the negative sign is the result of the (1− θ) component of the Pareto weight. We can also right out an
analogous and identical formulation for the change in ξi from a change in yB
∂ξi
∂yB
= ∂ξ
A
i
∂θ
∂θ
∂yB
− ∂ξ
B
i
∂θ
∂θ
∂yB
If income is pooled, then changes in partner specific incomes should not affect demand when total income is
held constant. This implies that, the partial derivatives of the changes in ξAi and ξBi with respect to θ should
be equal.
∂ξAi
∂θ
= ∂ξ
B
i
∂θ
If this is the case, then the ratio of the two partials should be
∂ξi
∂yA
∂ξi
∂yB
=
(∂ξ
A
i
∂θ − ∂ξ
B
i
∂θ )
∂θ
∂yA
(∂ξ
A
i
∂θ −
∂ξB
i
∂θ )
∂θ
∂yB
This resolves into the equivalent ratios
∂ξi
∂yA
∂ξi
∂yB
=
∂θ
∂yA
∂θ
∂yB
(4)
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The left hand ratio is the ratio of the demand for every good, over each distribution factor, conditional on
total income. It is a key calculation in testing the collective approach. In order to be efficient, these ratios
must be equivalent for all goods and also be equal to the distribution factor effects on the Pareto weights.
The right hand side of the expression is independent of i (it should be the same for any good that the
household consumes), so we can test for Pareto efficiency within the household by estimating left hand ratio
for as many goods as possible using the available data, and then testing whether they are the same. By
replacing partner specific income shares with zk and zl, any two distribution factors, the proportionality
condition can be stated generally as
∂ξi/∂zk
∂ξi/∂zl
= ∂ξj/∂zk
∂ξj/∂zl
∀i, j, k, l (5)
The proportionality condition has the following intuition: The effect of a change of the distribution factors on
the demand for a goods should be equally proportional to the impact of the distribution factors on the Pareto
weight, as the distribution factors only effect demand through the Pareto weight. Because the proportionality
condition holds for the distribution factors’ effects on all goods, the ratio of the partial derivatives should be
equal for all goods.
Another feature of the equation 4 is that it is a generalised version of the efficiency that holds under the
unitary model. When income is pooled, who contributes income makes no difference, so the ratios stated
above should be equal to one.
∂ξi
∂yA
∂ξi
∂yB
=
∂θ
∂yA
∂θ
∂yB
=
∂ξj
∂yA
∂ξj
∂yB
= 1
If zk and zl are partner specific, the test for income pooling can be stated more generally as
∂ξi/∂zk
∂ξi/∂zl
= ∂ξj/∂zk
∂ξj/∂zl
= 1 ∀i, j, k, l (6)
This provides us with a set of nested tests, equations 5 & 6, requiring that the proportions are equal under
collective rationality, and that the proportions are jointly equal to one under the unitary model.
Bourguignon et al. (2009) develop another test for the proportionality condition based on an alternative
specification of the demand system which is consistent with collective rationality, which they term the
z-conditional demand system. This approach helps address the empirical difficulties that arise when testing
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the proportionality condition, as it allows linear Wald tests of the restrictions.11 This approach requires the
additional assumption that there exists one distribution factor, z1, that has a strictly monotonic influence on
one of the consumption goods, j. If this is assumed, then Cj can be inverted on z1
z1 = g(y,a, z−1, Cj)
Here, z−1 is a vector of all distribution factors except the first distribution factor z1. This can be can
substituted into the remaining demand functions for the remaining goods i 6= j
Ci = ξi(y,a, z1, z−1) = ξi(y,a, g(y,a, z−1, Cj), z−1) = θji (y,a, z−1, Cj)
Now, each demand function for goods j 6= 1 can be written as a function of the total expenditure, preferences,
and all but the last distribution factors and the quantity of good j. The resulting system is referred to as the
system of z-conditional demands. It is reduced in dimension by one as it contains one less distribution factor
than the original system. Each new demand equation also has a new independent variable, Cj , or the budget
share for good j. Based on this system, Bourguignon et al. (2009) demonstrate that the following condition
can be derived
∂θji (y,a, z−1, Cj)
∂zk
= 0 ∀i 6= j and k = 2, ...,K (7)
This implies that the demand for any other good Ci, conditional on Cj , should be independent of not only z1,
but any other distribution factor. It is important to note that Cj is now endogenous in the demand for Ci as
any unobservable determinants of the demand for the Cj are now a function of the demand for Ci. In order
to address this, the common approach is to instrument Cj with z1. The intuition behind equation 7 is that
the size of the conditioning good Cj provides enough information to asses whether the household equilibrium
stays on the efficiency frontier when relative power of the partners change (Bobonis, 2009). Therefore, the
other distribution factors provide no additional information needed to assess whether efficiency holds.
These two conditions are the testable restrictions of the collective model. As long as we observe at least two
distribution factors, and the consumption levels of at least two goods, we can distinguish between the unitary
and collective models. Without variation in prices, these are the only testable restrictions of the collective
model. It is also essential that for one of the distribution factors, it is possible to invert one of the demand
functions. Thus, the demand for one good needs to be monotonically increasing with respect to at least one
distribution factor.
11Non linear Wald tests are not invariant to mathematically equivalent restatements of the null hypothesis (Gregory and Veall,
1985; Lafontaine and White, 1986)
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In this analysis, I implement an empirical version of the test of the unitary approach, equation 6, and the
tests of collective rationality based on the proportionality condition, equation 5, and on the z-conditional
demand, equation 7. The main difficulty in this exercise is identifying two plausibly exogenous distribution
factors. The LRAD program offers an opportunity to identify suitable candidates. In the following section I
provide an overview of the LRAD program, describe of the evaluation data and then explain the choice of
distribution factors that I use to conduct the tests.
4 Land Reform, LRAD and Evaluation Data
4.1 Land reform and LRAD
The dispossession of land from the South African black majority was a cornerstone of colonial policy during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bundy, 1988; Keswell & Carter, 2014). The resulting racialised
patterns of land ownership would be consolidated in the early twentieth century with the passing of the 1913
Natives Land Act, which prevented most of the black majority from purchasing land outside of the areas
allocated to the homelands (Wolpe, 1972; Binswanger-Mkhize & Deininger, 1993). During the Apartheid era,
policies placed further racial restrictions on land ownership, and implemented programs of forced removals
and resettlement of those living in multiracial areas. The result left South Africa with one of the most unequal
distributions of land ownership in the world, with the majority of black South Africans residing in urban
townships and the homelands, deprived of access to productive farmland (Binswanger & Deininger, 1993).
In light of this, the first democratically elected government of the post-Apartheid era set land reform as a key
agenda (Walker, 2001). The program was conceived as comprising of three pillars: restitution, tenure reform
and redistribution. The objective of restitution is to restore land to those dispossessed by former racially
discriminatory legislation and policy, with specific cases dealt through the Land Claims Court. Tenure reform,
arguably the most wide reaching pillar, seeks to improve tenure security through a review of current land
policy with an aim to develop more inclusive forms of land tenure. This is largely done through pilot projects
and focuses on those living in the former homelands where land tenure is often insecure. Redistribution, the
pillar under which LRAD falls, provides opportunities for black South Africans who are interested in gaining
access to land, but are not eligible under the other two pillars.
In addition to these objectives, the development of the land reform program was subject to constitutional
gender and equity mandates (Walker, 2006). This was in part to shift male-dominated traditional land
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holding patterns of the former homelands and rural commercial areas, which prevented women from gaining
access to and control of land (Hart, Chandia & Jacobs, 2018).12 Early policy documents of the Department
of Land Affairs set targets for redistribution of farmland to black women, people with disabilities and black
youth with an interest in farming (Walker, 2006).
Initially, land redistribution was conducted through the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which
was conducted at the household level, focusing on poorer rural households. Beneficiary households received
R 16 000 each to purchase land. Often, these small amounts were too little to acquire productive tracts
of farmland, and so households joined together to form trusts and community property associations to
receive the grants collectively and then purchase the land (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014). A result of SLAG’s
household level focus is that few women became transfer recipients. Typically, the title deed was placed in
the name of the household head, who were men for the majority of beneficiary households (Walker, 2006;
Hart, Chandia & Jacobs, 2018). Women tended to only gain land ownership where they where the head of a
single sex household (a minority of beneficiaries), or when they were married to a male household head in
common property and the title deed was registered in both partners’ names. Moreover, when grant amounts
were combined to acquire land through CPAs, qualitative evidence suggests that women, including female
household heads, had less control and influence over land within these structures (Walker, 2003).
During this initial phase, progress on land reform was slow and inefficient, with less than one per cent of
commercial farmland having been redistributed by 1999 (Walker, 2006). In response, the South African
government overhauled the program, placing more emphasis on restructuring commercial agriculture, and
created the LRAD program. LRAD differed from SLAG by shifting the focus from households to individuals
or groups of self selected individuals (Walker, 2006; Keswell & Carter, 2014). Any black South African
was eligible for a grant for land acquisition, provided they made a self-contribution, and used the land for
agricultural purposes (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014; Walker, 2006). Unlike earlier programs, LRAD’s final policy
document explicitly mandated that a third of the land redistributed through the program was to go to women
(Walker, 2006). The program required that individuals lived on or near the land that they wished to acquire,
and also barred individuals who held public office, were civil servants or their relatives from benefiting under
the program (Keswell & Carter, 2014). Through LRAD, the state committed to transfer 30 per cent of
12Historical and contemporary accounts suggest that that within former homelands and rural areas, men are traditionally
designated as the owners of property, particularly farmland and the family’s homestead (Bundy, 1988; Catling, 2008; Hart,
2008; Klienbooi, 2013). These ownership patterns are largely based on customary, traditional and common law (Budlender
et al., 2011). Despite this, women were largely responsible for the households food production for consumption, where men
are primarily responsible for commercial farming. While early historical records and missionary reports describe instances of
exclusive female land owners, typically in single sex households, it is men who have traditionally controlled land along with the
majority of the household resources (Aliber and Hart, 2009; Catling, 2008; Hart, Chandia & Jacobs, 2018).
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commercial land from white to black owners by 2015 (Walker, 2006), a target that was not achieved (Hart,
Chandia & Jacobs, 2018).
LRAD’s grant awarding process worked on the basis of a sliding scale that would increase with the amount
contributed by the applicant. The minimum grant amount R 20 000 and requires a contribution of R 50 000
from the applicant. The maximum grant amount was R 100 000 and would have to have been matched by
the applicant by an amount of R 40 000 (Ministry for Agriculture and Land Affairs, 2000). Applicants could
make their contributions in cash, in-kind, or in the form of a commitment of labour to the project (Walker,
2006). In practice, beneficiaries living in similar locations would pool their grants together within a common
project. This would be used to purchase agricultural land, which would become the shared property of the
beneficiaries (Keswell & Carter, 2014). As with many market assisted programs, LRAD was intended to
channel benefits to individuals with an established aptitude for agriculture. While this is advantageous in
terms of program targeting, this self-selection makes any analysis of the households within the program less
generalisable than if beneficiaries were randomly selected.
The shift from SLAG to LRAD produced a notable change in the gender patterns of land ownership amongst
recipients: the wider establishment of ownership structures where women co-owned land alongside men
(Walker 2009; Hart, Chandia & Jacobs, 2018). This resulted from two features of LRAD: the shift from
household to individual beneficiary selection, and the requirement that beneficiaries contributed a share of
the finances to purchase the land, or make a contribution in assets or in household labour to the projects.
Because of this, less wealthy household heads were obliged to include other household members in order to
pool resources in order to raise the own-contribution amount, resulting in women being included in household
applications (Hart, Chandia & Jacobs, 2018). On the other hand, female applicants included the male
household heads in their applications, as they were traditionally seen as the spokespersons of the household
and the custodians of land. Moreover, post settlement support services tended to be male dominated and
thus male members of the households are needed to utilise these services (Hart and Aliber, 2010). However,
it is unclear whether this de jure share in ownership affects the de facto control in land, and if this influences
the gender dynamics and joint decision making within households.
During operation, LRAD suffered from ineffective implementation and poor post-settlement support, which
lead to the failures of many projects (Lahiff, 2007; Dawood et al., 2014). Eventually LRAD was ‘starved
of budget and ultimately side-lined’ (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2014), and replaced by the Productive Land
Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) by 2007.13 Despite LRAD’s problems, the evidence suggests that the LRAD
13Departing from formal transfers of land, PLAS purchases land from willing buyers and leases the land to applicants. This
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program did have a positive impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries. Keswell & Carter (2014) conduct the
only properly specified impact evaluation of any land reform program in South Africa, and conclude that
LRAD beneficiaries experienced a 25 per cent increase in their per capita consumption, with their living
standards 150 per cent higher than their initial levels after three to four years.
4.2 Program evaluation data and descriptive statistics
The data employed in this analysis come from the 2007 national Quality of Life Survey of beneficiary
households and communities participating in South Africa’s land reform programs, undertaken for the
Monitoring and Evaluation Program of the Department of Land Affairs.14 The study was the final in a series
of cross sectional surveys commissioned by the DLA to study the impact of land reform on the beneficiary
livelihoods. The first was conducted in 1998/1999, followed by a subsequent survey in 2000/2001 (DLA,
2003). The most recent survey was implemented from 2005 until 200715 and captured information for 3
712 beneficiary households. For the purpose of this analysis, I begin by limiting the sample to the 1 762
households who were participants in the LRAD program at the time. This sample includes both beneficiary
households who had received transfer of land grants from the program, as well as those who are still awaiting
transfer.
As described previously, LRAD is implemented at the project level, which brought together several beneficiary
households to work together on a single farm. The sampling procedure of these projects followed a multi-level
design, with sample projects being selected from all projects within the study regions with a probability of
selection proportional to the number of households and individuals involved (Keswell & Carter, 2014). After
this random sample was selected, certain projects were screened out in order to remove weak projects and
applications. Projects were removed from the sample if they had not received a ‘designation memo’ from the
DLA, which indicates that the applicants had successfully navigated the administrative process necessary to
achieve approval on the project. The projects that were screened out where then replaced with new, randomly
selected projects. This process was repeated until the sample was replenished (Keswell & Carter, 2014).
The Quality of Life survey consisted of a household and a community questionnaire, with interviews conducted
with a representative of each. The household survey was administered to a member of the household who
lease hood is subject to a series of conditions, including the requirement that beneficiaries must prove they were farming the
land, and consult with a designated mentor, typically a while farmer (Hart, Chandia & Jacobs, 2018)
14The data used in this analysis are based on that used in Keswell and Carter (2014). Deidentificed data files, meta data and
do files of aggregate consumption data and grant information data provided by Malcolm Keswell. This analysis relies on data
collected through the household survey, primarily from four of the household survey’s modules: a household roster, a section on
assets, a section on project governance and a section on expenditure, consumption and savings.
15Delays were caused by a hold up of fieldwork operations in certain areas.
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could provide information on the various outcomes, usually a household head. Modules within the household
survey were designed to measure the quality of life enjoyed by the members of the beneficiary household, as
well as to assess the targeting and equity components of the land reform program (May, 2000).
An appealing feature of the data comes from the fact that the roster collected information on LRAD grant
applications at the individual level. Information is collected on whether each household member applied for a
land grant from the DLA, when they first applied for a grant, how much was applied for, and whether it was
received. This information was collected for both households who had received transfer of the land grant from
the DLA, as well as those still awaiting transfer. This information is essential for the identification strategy
pursued in this analysis, which I discuss in section 5.16 Further information on household-level characteristics
are obtainable from the asset and project governance sections of the survey. Information was collected on the
type of materials used to construct the household’s residence, along with whether the household owned the
homestead, both before and after transfer. The project governance section detailed the type of structure
through which the project was governed and how the household heard about the program. Additionally,
interviewers also recorded the date of interview, the language in which the interview was conducted, and took
a series of GPS readings at the site of the homestead.
The household survey’s module on expenditure, consumption and savings collected detailed information on
monthly consumption patterns for food (both purchased and produced) and non-food items. Using the data
collected on expenditures on purchased household items, monthly budget shares are constructed for 14 goods
categories.17 For foodstuff, budget shares are constructed for grains and other cereals, fruit and vegetables,
sugar, meat and other food goods. For non-food goods, budget shares are constructed for alcohol and tobacco,
hygiene products and entertainment, transport, adult clothing, healthcare, schooling expenses and a category
for non-food items. Total household monthly expenditure is calculated as the sum of all expenditure across
consumption groups, and is expressed in 2005 prices.18 For each goods category, a budget share is constructed
by dividing the monthly goods category expenditure by the households total monthly expenditure.
In addition to limiting the sample to households involved with LRAD, several other restrictions are made.
Table 1 reports the size of the sample after each restriction is imposed. In order to test how demand for
goods responds to male targeted transfers versus female targeted transfers, it is necessary that there are
16The household survey also included a section collecting plot level information, including the land’s size and value, who
possessed rights in the land, and the property scheme under which it was governed. However, for the majority of sampled LRAD
projects, non responses meant that it was not possible to link plots with the identity of owners within the household. Moreover,
this information was not available for households still awaiting transfer.
17Where non-food items are aggregated into yearly figures, the value is divided by twelve.
18Table 13 in the appendix details what items are included within each goods category.
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Table 1: Sample size after each restriction
Restriction made Obs.
No restrictions (all households) 3 712
Only households engaged in LRAD 1 762
At least one man and woman in household 1 538
At least one grant applicant in household 1 283
Not all men/women have missing grant amounts 1 207
Data for all covariates 1 123
Final sample size 1 123
both adult men and women in the household.19 For this reason, I restrict the sample to households who
have at least one man and one woman woman residing within the home. Next, in order for the size of land
grant to be used as distribution factor, it needs to be assignable to a decision maker, or at least a group of
decision makers. In other words, at least one LRAD grant within the household needs to be applied for by
an individual. Therefore, I also restrict the sample to households in which at least one adult applied for a
grant individually.20 Additionally, households are excluded where there are missing values for the size of
the land grant for all male or female applicants in the household. This results in a sample consisting of 1
207 individuals, of which 786 had yet to receive a grant amount from the DLA, and 421 who had received
transfer.21
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for the various characteristics for all households, and
the means for the households that had received transfer of the grant at the time of interview, and those
who had not.22 The final column presents the difference between the means across these two subgroups and
whether this difference is significant. In part A of the table, the demographic and other basic household
characteristics are presented, followed by the total household expenditures and grant shares in part B, and
the budget shares in part C.
Part A of the table reports several basic characteristics of the sample households. The sample is drawn from
all nine provinces, with 30 per cent of households located in KwaZulu-Natal. This geographic distribution is
reflected in the fact that over 38 per cent of the households were interviewed in isiZulu. As all households
are comprised of black South Africans, and about five per cent of the interviews were conducted in either
19For the purposes of this analysis, a person is considered an adult when they are over the age of eighteen.
20This results in the final sample consisting of households where both men and women will co-own the land they acquire,
households where only men acquire rights, and households where women only acquire rights.
21When the demand systems are estimated, missing values in covariates result in a sample of 1 123 observations.
22The separation of the sample into pre and post transfer groups motivated by the empirical strategy as described in section 5,
which relies on an indicator variable for post treatment status.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample Pre-Transfer Post-Transfer Difference
Mean s.d. Mean Mean µpost − µpre
A. Household Characteristics
Household size 6.62 (3.75) 6.71 6.43 −0.27
Number of women 2.57 (1.60) 2.60 2.50 −0.11
Number of men 2.70 (1.93) 2.72 2.65 −0.07
Number of children age 0-12 1.92 (1.85) 1.91 1.93 0.02
Number of children age 13-18 1.03 (1.22) 1.09 0.91 −0.19∗∗
Women with primary schooling (%) 69.75 (80.42) 70.51 68.24 −2.28
Men with primary schooling (%) 66.36 (36.78) 66.06 66.95 0.89
Mean education (yrs) 8.52 (2.94) 8.40 8.76 0.36∗
Mean farming experience (yrs) 1.30 (3.06) 1.27 1.36 0.09
Household head is a man 0.71 (0.45) 0.68 0.78 0.09∗∗∗
Household head age 53.22 (17.06) 52.59 54.45 1.85
Education of household head (yrs) 5.79 (4.57) 5.60 6.17 0.57∗
Distance to DLA office (km) 95.83 (55.73) 92.82 101.77 8.94∗∗
Mud floor 0.32 (0.47) 0.35 0.26 −0.09∗∗∗
Own homestead 0.76 (0.43) 0.70 0.86 0.16∗∗∗
Application year 2001.07 (3.27) 2001.60 2000.02 −1.58∗∗∗
Province
Limpopo 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 0.06 0.03∗∗
Mpumalanga 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 0.10 −0.02
North West 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 0.13 0.04∗
Gauteng 0.06 (0.24) 0.04 0.11 0.08∗∗∗
Northern Cape 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 0.06 0.04∗∗∗
Kwa-Zulu Natal 0.30 (0.46) 0.38 0.12 −0.26∗∗∗
Free State 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 0.13 −0.03
Western Cape 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 0.02 −0.01
Eastern Cape 0.17 (0.38) 0.13 0.26 0.13∗∗∗
Language of interview
English 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 0.02 0.01
Afrikaans 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 0.05 0.01
IsiXhosa 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 0.27 0.11∗∗∗
IsiZulu 0.38 (0.49) 0.46 0.21 −0.26∗∗∗
Setswana 0.13 (0.34) 0.11 0.17 0.06∗∗
Sesotho 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 0.22 0.02
SePedi 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 0.05 0.03∗∗
SiSwati 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 0.01 0.00
Recipient Women 1.12 (1.05) 1.16 1.02 −0.14∗
Recipient Men 1.28 (1.26) 1.32 1.20 −0.11
Women who are recipients (%) 49.65 (40.33) 50.61 47.75 −2.86
Men who are recipients (%) 53.72 (39.03) 54.07 53.02 −1.05
B. Household Resources (2005 ZAR)
Household expenditures 2452.56 (3484.04) 2275.77 2802.45 526.69∗
Household expenditures per capita 472.44 (811.55) 434.20 548.21 114.01∗
Total grant amount going to:
Women 74300.75 (370944.47) 82793.34 57453.83 −25339.51
Men 79660.90 (294204.33) 81700.61 75614.68 −6085.93
Average grant amount going to:
Women 33561.95 (138819.28) 37641.69 25468.90 −12172.79
Men 45510.95 (220789.00) 50410.68 35791.26 −14619.42
C. Expenditure Shares (%)
Grains 13.58 (9.98) 14.19 12.37 −1.82∗∗
Fruits & Vegetables 7.28 (4.78) 7.28 7.30 0.02
Sugar 2.78 (2.61) 2.68 2.98 0.30
Meat 11.88 (7.93) 11.65 12.33 0.68
Other Food 8.80 (6.49) 8.94 8.51 −0.43
Alcohol & Tobacco 3.15 (5.92) 3.45 2.55 −0.90∗
Hygiene 5.05 (5.12) 4.96 5.23 0.26
Transport 9.95 (12.07) 9.64 10.56 0.92
Child Clothing 2.39 (3.23) 2.60 1.97 −0.63∗∗∗
Fuel 2.07 (3.79) 2.23 1.75 −0.48∗
Adult Clothing 2.05 (2.68) 2.29 1.59 −0.69∗∗∗
Healthcare 1.08 (2.63) 1.13 0.98 −0.14
Schooling 3.05 (5.93) 3.13 2.91 −0.21
Other Non-Foods 25.65 (17.35) 24.64 27.65 3.02∗∗
Total Food 44.26 (20.11) 44.64 43.49 −1.15
Total Non Food 54.35 (19.45) 53.93 55.19 1.26
Observations 1207 786 421 1207
Note - The rightmost column reports the difference between means for the pre and post transfer groups.
Asterisks indicate whether the difference in means is statistically significant.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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English or Afrikaans, the language of interview provides a plausible proxy for the ethnic-linguistic group of
the household residents.
There are on average 6.62 residents in each household, comprising of on average just over two and a half men,
just over two and a half women, almost two children under the age of thirteen, and a child aged between
thirteen and eighteen. Households tend to contain more than one adult of the same sex, with only 17 per
cent of households being what the literature would consider nuclear (containing only two adults, each of the
opposite sex), and just less than 40 per cent of households including less than two men or two women.23
Average primary schooling among adults of the household, a proxy for literacy, is similar for both men and
women, being 69,75 per cent and 66,36 per cent respectively. The majority of households are headed by men
(70 per cent), and are on average 53.22 years of age.
Individual grant transfers tend to be directed to only a small number of household members. On average,
households have 1.12 women recipients, and 1.28 male recipients. While the number of female grant applicants
range from zero to five, and zero to five for male applicants, 65 per cent of households either have only one
beneficiary, or two of the opposite sex. In these cases, the head of the household and their spouse are typically
the recipients. However, male residents are slightly more likely to be recipients compared to women (49.65
versus 53.72 per cent).
Part B presents differences in household resources. Both total and average grant size differs by sex. Total
grant size is lower for women compared to men (R 74 300.75 versus R 79 660.90) as well as average grant size
for women than men (R33 561.95 versus R 45 510.95). The sampled households had average total monthly
expenses of R 2 452.56, and per capita consumption at R 472.44 per month. This places average per capita
household consumption on the just above the 2005 upper bound poverty line of R 413 (Statistics South Africa,
2014). Part C presents the expenditure shares of the goods categories. On average, households split their
budget roughly equally between food and non-food items (44.26 per cent and 54.35 per cent respectively),
with grains, cereals followed by meat-products taking up the largest share of the food basket, and the ‘other
non-food’ category comprising more than half of non-food expenses.
Several mean household characteristics differ across households who are pre-transfer and those who are
post-transfer. Households who have received transfer at the time of transfer applied earlier, and are less
likely to reside in KwaZulu-Natal, corresponding with a lower share being interviewed in isiZulu. Households
that are post-treatment are closer to the DLA offices. They are also more likely to own their home at the
23Refer to table 4 for a cross tabulation of resident men and women.
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time of interview, and less likely that their home has a mud floor compared to those still awaiting transfer.
Expenditure is on average R 526.69 higher (a greater per capita expenditure of R 114) for households who
are post-transfer, reflecting both that households with higher incomes moved through the application process
faster, as well as the positive impact the program had on beneficiary households (Keswell & Carter, 2014).
While pre and post transfer groups do not differ significantly in their budgetary split between food and
non-food items, there are small but significant reallocations across categories within the budget. Post transfer
groups spend less on grains, and spend less on items in the ‘other foods’ category. The largest difference
between these groups is for schooling expenditures, with post-transfer groups spending just over three per
cent more on this share.
5 Distribution Factors
In order to conduct the unitary and proportionality tests, two plausible distribution factors need to be
identified. This is arguably the most challenging task of this empirical exercise. In this analysis, I opt to
use distribution factors based on the total of the reported values of each individual land grant applied for
by men in a household, Gm and total of the reported values of each land grant applied for individually by
women in the household, Gw.24 As described above, LRAD grants are used to purchase or improve land.
Exogenous variation in the grant allocations across the men and women of the household, could arguably
shift the claims that household members will have on the land that is purchased with them, and if this is the
case shift the balance of power within the bargaining process.
Of course, the transfer of property rights is not the only way that LRAD might alter the relative distribution
of power within the household, as the program confers benefits that vary across individuals. For example,
whether a person is an active participant in the running of the land project, or is a member of the governance
structure, would arguably shift their bargaining power within the home.25 However, the size of the land
grant is the most intuitive and straightforward shifter of ‘power’ transferred through the LRAD project.
Furthermore, a focus on a transfer in grant size, and thus claim to land assets, connects this analysis with the
body of empirical research on the role of asset ownership in improving female empowerment in the developing
world (Doss 2003; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003).
24These aggregates are calculated by summing the value (in 2005 ZAR) of the land grant that each household member had
applied for as an individual, disaggregated by gender, as reported in the household roster. Values were either reported as zero,
ranging between R 20 000 and R 100 000 - the maximum or minimum LRAD grant sizes - or missing. Households were dropped
from the sample if either all men or all women had missing grant amounts. Otherwise, individual missing amounts were recorded
as zero, and the member is considered a non-applicant.
25Then again, such effects might also be endogenous to ex-ante power.
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Several features of the data make Gm and Gw appealing candidates for distribution factors. Firstly, both
have varying non-zero values.26 Secondly, Gm and Gw vary separately, with a correlation coefficient of 0.5437.
This is evident in Figure 3, which presents a scatter plot of Gm against Gw , and Figure 4, focusing on
households with Gm and Gw where values are less than 200 000. Also, there is no significant relationship
between the households sum of land grants, Gw + Gm, and the share that was applied for by women
Gw/Ga = Gw/(Gw+Gm), as is evident in the scatter plot in Figure 5, indicating that variation in the relative
share of women’s claims on total household grant value is not determined by overall value. However, it is
clear from Figures 3, 4 and 5 that the distribution bunches at certain values of Gw/Ga: where Gw/Ga = 1
(and Gm = 0 ) where Gw/Ga = 0 (and Gw = 0) and where Gw/Ga = 0.5 (where Gm = Gw). Table 3 shows
the share of the data at these at these points, this suggests that for the majority of the data (73.3 per cent),
either one gender received no grants, or each genders total grant value was equal. While theory places no
requirement that the distribution of a distribution factors are not bunched at a value27, this comes at the
cost of a reduction in variation.
In order to meet the definition of a distribution factor, Gm or Gw need to be exogenous to household
preferences. This is a strong assumption. Firstly, individual grant maximums imply that grants over a
certain size require larger numbers of household residents. Fortunately, the number of men and women in
the household is an observable characteristic and thus can be controlled for. However, the program required
that individuals match the grant with their own contributions, either in the form of cash, or in the form of a
pledge of an amount of livestock, farming equipment or future labour to the land project. Thus the grant
amounts will be correlated with ex-ante (prior to application) distributions of wealth and human capital
amongst members of the household. Moreover, other household preferences, such as taste for equality and
gender allocations of labour might affect who applied for what amount. If these measures are correlated with
preferences and the household budget, which is very likely, then the individual grant allocations will likely be
endogenous.
The conventional procedure in this instance would be to use an instrumental variables approach, such as
Quisimbing and Maluccio (2003), or to rely on an arbitrary discontinuity in the treatment eligibility of the
transfer program, such as Lavy (2002) or Duflo (2003). However, a plausible instrument for individual land
grant values is difficult to conceive of. There are no idiosyncrasies about the program that could produce
differences in the eligibility requirements across men an women, such as differing age requirements across
gender of the pension scheme used in Duflo (2003). While an inspection of the data indicates that the later
26where Gm 6= 0 for 78,5 % of the data and Gw 6= 0 for 73,5 % of the data.
27Indeed, indicator variables have been used to test collective and unitary rationality (Duflo, 2003; Bobonis, 2009)
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the household applied, the larger the share of total household grant income was applied for in the names of
female members, the association looses its significance once demographic controls are accounted for.
To address the endogeneity concern, an alternative set of distribution factors are employed: interaction terms
between total grant amount by gender and an indicator for the household having received the land grants from
the DLA at the time of interview. This strategy exploits the fact that the survey collected information on the
size of the land grant each household member applied for, regardless of whether the household members had
received those amounts by the time of the interview. What follows is a justification as to why this approach
addresses the potential endogeniety of the distribution factors.
5.1 Interaction terms as distribution factors
For ease of argument, I make two assumptions which will be later interrogated. Firstly, I assume that grant
transfers only influence bargaining power after they have been transferred to the applicant (An application
alone will not affect one’s bargaining position). Secondly, I assume that a household’s post-transfer status is
random: i.e household status is exogenous to any household characteristics that might affect expenditure
decisions. To emphasise this, I will refer to households that are post-transfer at the time of interview as being
in the treatment group, and those that are not as being in the control group.
Given these assumptions, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the causal pathways through which household preferences
can influence household consumption, and how this differs across the treatment and control groups. Figure
1 illustrates the case of the treatment group, in which two channels are distinguished. The first channel is
through which household preferences determine the grants going to women and men, which, once transferred
will alter consumption. The second channel captures any other pathway through which preferences affect
consumption. Figure 1 illustrates the endogeneity problem encountered if one were to use relative grant
sizes as a distribution factor. Any unobservable pathways would confound any estimates of the impact of
grant shares on household demand. Figure 2 illustrates the channels through which household characteristics
Figure 1: Treatment group Figure 2: Control group
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affect spending patterns in the control group. Because the grant has not yet been transferred, only the
second channel is a potential pathway. While preferences can influence grant applications, grant applications
cannot influence the budget structure, and thus channel one is closed. This highlights an important feature.
Having assumed exogeneity of treatment assignment, the difference in the association between grant sizes and
household demand in the control versus the treatment group captures the transfer effect operating through
channel one. This allows for the construction of plausible distribution factors by interacting each genders
grant size with the treatment indicator.
To illustrate this, consider a specification where the gender distribution of the total land grant amount is
expressed as the share of the total grant amount that is received by women, Gw/Ga. In this specification, the
budget share of good j is regressed on Gw/Ga , a treatment indicator T and an interaction term between
the two. In line with a standard coefficient interpretation, the coefficient on the interaction term indicates
how the effect of Gw/Ga on the demand for good j differs between the treatment and control groups. As
group assignment is assumed exogenous to household characteristics, this difference reflects the difference in
impact that an increase in Gw/Ga has on demand, relative to the association that Gw/Ga has with demand
in the control group. In effect, the presence of Gw/Ga, along-side the interaction term, controls for the
unobserved factors which in it’s absence might be correlated with the interaction term.
In the absence of exogenous variation in Gw/Ga, this offers an alternative way to observe whether such
variation would have a significant effect in the budget structure. If there is no difference in the effect of
Gw/Ga across treated and control groups, then there is no effect occurring through the first channel. This
argument also applies to specifications where the gender distribution of land grants is expressed as two
separate regressors, Gw and Gm, indicating the total amount going to men and women respectively, along
with two interaction terms for each.28 This specification produces two plausible distribution factors , and
under the unitary model, it is expected that these two coefficients would be equal across demand functions.
Given confidence in this approach, I now turn to interrogating the reliability of the assumptions upon which
it is based. Would it be the case that the distribution of land grants can only alter the budget structure
once the grant has been transferred? Expectation of a future grants may influence bargaining power. For
example, it may be the case that household members can use their expectation of a future grant distribution,
as leverage within pre-transfer bargaining processes. In this case, there will still be an open first channel for
those in the control group. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the bargaining power received from received
28Put differently, the terms Gw and Gm control for any endogenous determinants of grant applications, leaving the interaction
terms to capture the effect of exogenous variation in grant transfers.
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grant transfers would differ from the power received from expected transfers. Uncertainty over the date of
transfer would likely diminish the impact of expectations. As long as the influence of expectations is not
equivalent to the actual transfer, this approach remains plausible. The second assumption that post transfer
status is exogenous is less certain. This concern is addressed in the following section.
5.2 Extracting exogeneity in post transfer status
To identify exogenous variation in post transfer status, I rely on the identification strategy pursued in
Keswell and Carter (2014), in which they estimate the impact of LRAD grant recipiency on total household
consumption. This research design relies on features of the LRAD implementation process, where at
several stages during the application process (registration, committee approvals, signing of sales contracts),
bureaucratic hold ups would result in highly variable delays in the beneficiaries receiving their land. Due
to these delays, otherwise similar households that could have received land grants sooner were still in the
administrative pipeline at the time of the survey interview for reasons largely independent of their household
characteristics (Keswell & Carter, 2014).
This being said, whether the household has received transfer at the time of interview is not generated by a
pure experiment. Because of the potential confounders, the differences in mean characteristics across the
pre and post transfer groups in table 2 cannot be treated simply as casual impact estimates. One possible
source of such confounding may arise from the fact that the households who are still pre-treatment at the
time of the survey interview applied later to the program. As a result, application time might proxy for
the eagerness of households to join the program, their anticipation of expected gains, or their preference for
risk. Indeed, as can be seen from table 2, post-transfer households are on average 1.58 years earlier than
households still awaiting transfer. This difference is statistically significant. These results suggest that it is
necessary to control for these variables within any statistical approach.
Along with the application date, another possible source of confounding might arise from the fact that better
applicants might move faster through LRAD’s implementation pipeline, resulting in better applicants being
more likely to be post-transfer at the time of interview. Looking exclusively at post-transfer households,
Keswell and Carter (2014) show that applicants who had been post transfer for longer, had taken less time to
move through the pipeline, independent of application date. In order to address this concern, it is necessary
to control for any factors that might affect the speed of transfer and might be correlated with other household
characteristics. At several points in the application process, the chances of an individual application to
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quickly progressing to the next stage of the process was reliant on the applicants’ ability to signal that they
had a strong interest and background in farming in order to justify the expenditure of state resources. To
control for these factors, covariates are included to account for differences in education in years of members
of the households, the average number of years of farming experience held by the participants, the value of
agricultural tools and equipment contributed by the project, whether the household contributed financially to
the application, and whether they contributed livestock.
Additionally, as most of the households in the sample report not having access to a telephone, proximity to
the department offices will allow the household to move through the complex application process at a faster
speed. Thus, another class of factors control for the accessibility of the household to the DLA offices. These
include the straight line distance between the site of the land project and the nearest Department of Land
Affairs.29 It may be the case that stronger applicants relocate to project sites more proximate to DLA offices,
thereby making distance endogenous to household characteristics (Carter & Keswell, 2014). To address this
concern, distance can be interacted with an indicator for whether the majority of household members moved
to be part of the project, taking on a value of one if they did.
In addition to controlling for these potential confounders, endogeniety is constrained by the highly selective
process of the LRAD beneficiaries. In order to be within the sample, households must have first self-selected
into the LRAD applicant pool, and then must navigate through a multi stage screening process, with
applicants with similarly high chances kept in the application pool, while applicants who are unlikely to
succeed being filtered out (Carter & Keswell, 2014). This results in a homogenisation of households, which
limits the potential that unobservable differences between groups within the sample.
The following empirical strategy relies on the assumption that there are sufficient observable characteristics
to control for any confounders that may be correlated with spending decisions that determine the speed at
which the household passes through the application pipeline. If this is done, it is possible to proceed using
the interaction terms, as described above, as plausible distribution factors. What follows is a discussion of
how this strategy is implemented in order to test the collective and unitary tests.
29Calculated from GPS readings taken at interview sites and DLA offices.
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6 Empirical Implementation
6.1 Tests based on an estimation of the standard demand system
In this section, I describe the econometric models used to test the unitary and collective model, along with
the assumptions necessary for identification. As stated above, each household has a demand function for each
consumption good, as a function of prices, household resources, gender specific grant application amounts
and household and individual level characteristics. These demand functions can be estimated using the
Working-Lesser Engel equations
ln ξji = αj + βj1Ti lnGwi + βj2Ti lnGmi + γji ln (
yi
ni
) + δjµi + ji (8)
Where lnξi is the household demand for good j measured in terms of the log transformed household budget
share for good j, in household i.30 lnGmi and lnGwi are the log transformed female and male specific grant
amounts, each interacted with post transfer status indicator Ti to form the distribution factors.31 µi is a
collection of controls for household characteristics that are expected to affect household consumption besides
land grant allocations, including the treatment indicator and grant amounts. n is household size, and yini is
household consumption per capita. ji is the error term, containing unobservable determinants of the demand
for each good.
The vector of household characteristics include a series of demographic controls for the number of resident
men and women32, as well as the number of children by age group (0-5 years, 6-12 years, 13-18 years) and
by gender. Also included are variables for the share of household adults who are wage labourers, casual
labourers, and self employed by gender. As a proxy for ex-ante bargaining power, an indicator is included
for the share of men and women who report being married. Also included are indicators for the residence
having a dirt floor, the household owning the residence and the province. In addition, a control is included to
capture the date of the interview. This is in order to control for seasonal patterns of household expenditures
and agricultural income, as well as changes in prices over time. While there is no data detailing the ethnicity,
30To report effects as elasticises for the demand system (for ease of interpretation), all log transformations are performed via
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation ln ξi = ln (ξi + 1), in order to have defined values where the household budget share is
zero. The tests conducted are robust to this specification.
31Inverse hyperbolic sine transformations are also performed on grant amounts. Again, the tests are robust to this transforma-
tion.
32The specification departs from the typical formulation of the Working-Lesser system by disaggregating household size by
gender. This to observe whether demand responds differently to increases in household size depending on the gender of an
additional resident, and in order to control for the variation in lnGw and lnGm determined by household composition.
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religion or race group of household members (factors which may influence preferences), these characteristics
are proxied by a variable indicating the language in which the interview was conducted.
In keeping with the identification strategy, a variable for the date of application is controlled for. Several
variables are also included in order to control for household characteristics which might impact the speed at
which the household moves through the application pipeline, as well to control for any ex-ante bargaining
power between genders. These include the age, gender and level of education of the household head, the years
of farming experience of the household head, the number of household members with commercial farming
experience, and the average number of years of experience. Variables are also included to indicate the value of
tools and equipment committed to the project, and whether the household committed livestock, and whether
the household heard about the program directly from a government official.33
The demand system is estimated for the logarithmic transformation of the monthly budget shares for 14
goods categories: grains and cereals, fruit and vegetables, sugar, meat and meat products, other food items,
alcohol and tobacco, hygiene and entertainment, transport, child clothing, adult clothing, fuel, healthcare,
schooling and other non-food goods.34 Estimating the system for budget shares instead of expenditure levels
controls for different levels of expenditure across households. Additionally, analysing budget shares capture
the trade-offs in consumption choices that households make, as an increase in the budget share of one item
must result in the decrease of others.
The unitary model implies that consumption is only determined by total resource contributions, and as
a consequence the distribution of grant transfers within the household will not play a role in determining
intrahousehold resource allocation. This implies, conditional on total expenditure, that each gender specific
land grant coefficients are equivalent across all goods (βj1 = βj2 for all j), which can be tested via a linear
Wald test. On the other hand, under the alternative collective model, a change in a partner’s resource
contribution will have a varied impact on the demand for a good.
Additionally, under the collective model, it is also possible to estimate the demand effects of the female and
male specific land grant distribution factors. This enables the formulation of the proportionality condition
33All variables for demographic and household characteristics are added as covariates in all demand specifications. Coefficients
estimates are not reported in main tables. Detailed descriptions of these variables and their construction is provided in table 14
in the appendix.
34The goods items that are included in each category are listed in table 13 in the appendix.
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test: that the ratio of the distribution factor coefficients is the same for each good
βj1
βj2
= βk1
βk2
∀ goods j, k, j 6= k
Because there is no information on price variation, all of the regular price terms in the standard Working-Lesser
Engel curve are contained in the error terms. Unaddressed, this would bias our β estimates. The standard
way of dealing with this is to estimate the demand curves for all goods as a joint system using a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach. In order to conduct the proportionality tests, the demand equations
can be jointly estimated as a system via SUR, and then cross-equation restrictions over the distribution
factor coefficients are tested. Here, the Wald test formulation can be used to test the restrictions. However, a
major issue with this test is the fact that nonlinear Wald test statistics are non-invariant to mathematical
reformulation of the null (Bourguignon et al., 2009). To address this issue, the robustness of these results will
be assessed by conducting linear joint tests using the z-conditional demand system.
6.2 Test based on an estimation of the z-conditional demand system
I use the z-conditional approach to addresses the challenges of empirically testing the proportionality condition.
In order to implement this strategy, it is necessary to assume that the female distribution factor has a
monotonic influence on the budget share of one of the goods. It will be shown that the best candidate for
such a good is the healthcare consumption good category. Following Bourguignon et al. (2009) the demand
equation for the conditioning good, ξ1 can then be inverted on female distribution factor
Ti lnGfi =
ln ξ1i
β11
− α1
β11
− β11
β11
Ti lnGmi − γ1
β11
ln( yi
ni
)− δ1
β11
µi +
1
β11
1i
This can be substituted into all other demand functions for the remaining goods, resulting in the z-conditional
demand system
ln ξji = (αj− α1βj2
β11
)+ βj2
β11
ln ξ1i+(βj1− β11βj2
β12
)Ti lnGmi+(γj− γ1βj2
β11
) ln( yi
ni
)+(δj− δ1βj2
β11
)µi+ji− βj2
β11
1i
This applies to all goods j 6= 1. A Wald test of the joint significance of each coefficient estimates on the male
LRAD grant distribution factor, Ti lnGm across all goods will be the same as a test of the proportionality
condition (Bobonis; 2009). Using this specification, ξji is clearly endogenous in the demand for healthcare,
the latter being correlated with 1i. However, as I have already assumed that the female LRAD grant transfer
Ti lnGw is exogenous in terms of demand, it is possible to use it the distribution factor as an instrumental
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variable to address this endogeneity problem, via three stage least squares (3SLS).
7 Results
This section is divided into three parts. First, I present the results for the demand system estimated without
the interaction term distribution factors, first without measures of each gender’s land grant amount lnGfi
and lnGmi and then with these terms included. The purpose of this is to evaluate household consumption
response to income, and to assess whether there are any higher order income effects for household per capita
expenditure, and whether the system without any grant terms would be properly specified. Secondly, I present
the results of the demand system where the specifications include the interaction distribution factors Ti lnGfi
and Ti lnGmi35. Using these estimates I conduct the income pooling hypothesis test, and the proportionality
conditionality test. Thirdly and last, after investigating potential nonlinear effects of the distribution factors
on consumption in order to identify a good that is monotonically increasing in a distribution factor, I present
estimates for the system using the z-conditional approach and conduct the z-conditional test for collective
rationality.
7.1 Income effects: The demand system without distribution factors
I begin by estimating the demand system, based on equation 8, without the distribution factors. This system
includes demographic and household characteristics, including those relevant to the land project that the
household is involved in.36 In table 7, I present only the coefficients on the log transformed total expenditure
per capita along with its square, along with the coefficients on the number of resident men and women in the
household. Also reported is the χ2 test for the joint significance of the two log per capita expenditure terms
for each good, along with the p-value for the joint test beneath it.
From the results, it is clear that there are significant, non-zero income effects for many of the budget shares.
For the households, goods such as transport and expenditure on items in the other food category are luxuries
at the low end of the income distribution, and then become necessities as income increases. Conversely, sugar,
grains, child clothing and schooling are necessities at the lower end of the income distribution, while they
become luxuries at the upper end of the income distribution. There are also significant, non-zero (albeit small)
effects for the number of resident men and women. As the number of resident men increase, the coefficient
35For ease of interpretation, the distribution factors are denoted as (Transfer × lnGm) and (Transfer × lnGw) in later
tables.
36Detailed descriptions of these variables are presented in sections B and C of table 14 in the appendix
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signs would suggest a reallocation of spending from food to non-food items. Additionally, expenditure shares
of adult’s clothing increases as male household members increase, but the share spent on children’s clothing
decreases. Increases in the number of women in the household is associated with increases in schooling
expenditure, and decreases in the share of the budget spent on alcohol and tobacco, and meat. This might be
reflective of differences in preferences between men and women.37 The χ2 test of the joint significance of the
coefficients on the expenditure term and its square is significant across 11 of the 14 goods. Based on these
results, I proceed by using higher order expenditure terms in the subsequent regressions.38
In table 8, I estimate the same demand system, but include variables for the inverse hyperbolic log trans-
formation of the total value of land grants by gender, lnGw and lnGm. Comparing the coefficients on the
income variables between tables 7 and 8, it is clear the estimated income effects are robust to the inclusion
of each gender’s total land grant income. Nevertheless, there are significant non-zero coefficients for these
variables across several goods. Both lnGw and lnGm is negatively associated with the household’s budget
for meat goods. For other goods, the results suggest that demand responses associated with total grant
value differs by the gender of the recipients. Interestingly, the budget share of expenditure on healthcare and
schooling is has a significant, small but positive association with women’s total grant value, while not being
significantly responsive to increases in log transformed men’s grant income.
As discussed above, it is likely that lnGw and lnGm are endogenous to bargaining power dynamics prior to
grant application. For this reason, I interact the post-transfer indicator with lnGw and lnGm respectively to
generate more plausible distribution factors, which I use to estimate the demand system in the following
subsection. Nevertheless, I also conduct the proportionality and unitary tests based on the estimates reported
in table 8, treating lnGw and lnGm as if they were satisfactorily exogenous distribution factors. The χ2 test
for the joint significance of the coefficient estimates of the distribution factors rejects that these are equal
(χ2(25) statistic = 40.671; p-value = 0.02) and the nonlinear joint test of the proportionality condition fails
to reject the null hypothesis of Pareto efficiency (χ2(13) statistic = 4.889; p-value = 0.96).
7.2 The demand system with distribution factors
Table 9 reports the coefficients for the re-estimated demand system allowing for consumption shares to respond
to the two distribution factors: 1) the log transformation of total value of men’s land grants, interacted with
37The sign and significance of these coefficients are robust to the alternative specifications as set out in tables 6 , 8 and 9
38Table 6 presents a specification where log transformed expenditure per capita can only enter demand linearly. While this
specification also produces significant coefficients for 11 of the 14 goods, the quadratic specification allows for the possibility that
the responsiveness of demand for a good to income might differ over the income distribution.
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the transfer indicator Ti lnGm, and 2) the log transformation of the total value of women’s’ land grants,
interacted with the treatment indicator Ti lnGw.
Several comments can be made. Firstly, the distribution factors are not significant for many of the goods.
However, in the demand functions for grains and hygiene the coefficient estimate on the male distribution
factor is, while small, significant, being respectively positive and negative in direction. In the demand for
alcohol and tobacco, the estimated coefficient on the female distribution factor is significant. Under the
unitary rationality, the coefficients of the distribution factors are equal for each good. The joint significance
test for the distribution factor coefficients estimates rejects the null hypothesis that they are equal (χ2(13)
statistic = 44.828 p-value =0.017), rejecting the income pooling hypothesis. On this basis, I reject the unitary
model as an accurate description of household decision making. On the other hand, these estimates do not
violate the restrictions of the collective model. The joint test of the (nonlinear) proportionality condition
fails to reject the null hypothesis of allocative efficiency (χ2(13) statistic = 2.816 p-value =0.999). This
suggests that the household decision makers are able to make efficient allocations with regards to consumption.
However, the inability to reject the proportionality condition might simply be because the nonlinear Wald
test suffers from low statistical power. As a robustness check, I conduct the test of Pareto efficiency using the
alternative, z-conditional demand system formulation in the following subsection.
7.3 The z-conditional demand system
For the z-distributional approach to be used, there must exist two observable distribution factors and two
goods categories (Bourguignon et al., 2009). Moreover, it is necessary for one of the distribution factors
to have a positive, monotonic impact on at least one of the goods. To assess whether this is the case, I
first estimate the system allowing the distribution factors to enter nonlinearly. Table 10 reports the results
of a system specified to include the two distribution factors, along with their squares. The main result is
that apart from healthcare, all quadratic terms on both distribution factors are not significantly different
from zero at the five per cent level. The coefficients for the demand for healthcare indicate that, conditional
on household expenditures, consumption share for this good has a monotonic relationship with the female
distribution factor. Given this result, this good will be used to perform the inversion for the z-conditional
demand approach test.
Table 11 presents results of the test for collective rationality, using the z-conditional demand system, with
the log transformed expenditure share in healthcare as the conditional good, and Ti lnGm the remaining
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distribution factor. To do this, a 3SLS approach is used. Here, the instrument used to invert the conditioning
good’s demand equation is Ti lnGw.
The estimates for the unconditional demand system presented in table 9. The coefficient on the male grant
distribution factor is significant for a number of goods. In the z-conditional distribution, it is significant
nowhere. Unsurprisingly, the Wald test for significance of the coefficients fails to reject the null hypothesis
(χ2(12) statistic = 1.765 p-value =1). As Bourguignon et al. (2009) show, the requirement that the estimated
male distribution factor coefficient is equal to zero for at least one of the consumption goods is the same as
the proportionality condition test. As with the nonlinear Wald tests performed on the coefficient estimates
presented in table 9, this alternative test also fails to reject the null hypothesis that household decision makers
reach efficient allocation decisions regarding consumption.
8 Conclusion
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that rural South African farm households cannot be described
as monolithic entities, as if they are unaffected by the reallocation of resources controlled by household
members. Rather, when land rights are transferred to specific household members, expenditure responses are
sensitive to the gender of the recipient. This is consistent with other evidence rejecting the income pooling
hypothesis for black South African households (Krueser, 2009; Duflo, 2003; Wittenberg, 2009), as well as
evidence from other parts of the developing world. Moreover, I present evidence that despite heterogeneity in
preferences, rural South African farm households are able to reach an efficient allocation of resources with
respect to consumption.
What relevance does this have for land reform policy? While the rejection of the unitary model implies that
the gender of the land grant recipient does affect household demand response to grant size, these estimated
effects are very small. Moreover, these small responses to women’s grant increases are perhaps not aligned
with policy desirable expenditure reallocations (increased spending on children and healthcare) that have
often been observed when cash-grant programs target women (Duflo, 2003; Bobonis 2009). This is not to say
that land asset transfers to women is undesirable, but that, at least in the case of LRAD, a substantial shift
in expenditure towards schooling and healthcare is not an observed outcome when women received larger
shares of property rights.
Most importantly, the these results suggest that, in a rural setting of non functional land markets, and
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precarious food security, farming households are able to make consumption decisions in a way that the well
being of one member cannot be improved without decreasing the well being of another. This evidence suggests
that collective models of intrahousehold allocation are an accurate depiction of agricultural household decision
making for those engaged in land reform. Again, this does not suggest that improving the status of women is
either impractical or undesirable. This simply implies that thinking about these issues in the context of a
collective rationality framework is likely to be beneficial for both policy design and economic analysis (Rangel
& Thomas, 2012). Specifically, this suggests it would be fruitful to apply more structural versions of the
collective model to this context, allowing the estimation of intrahousehold inequality, individual level poverty
levels, as well as to make predictions of how other member’s consumption levels respond to different groups
benefiting through land reform programs.
These results are subject to three limitations which need to be addressed in further research. Firstly, the
identification strategy has relied on the self-selection of beneficiaries into the LRAD program, as well as
their likely homogenisation through the filtering of the administration process.While being consistent with
Krueser (2009) and Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), this means that external validity of the results can
only be generalised to other rural households, or all black South African households, with caution. It
would be beneficial to test whether collective rationally holds for farming households engaged in other land
reform schemes such as SLAG or PLAS, in order to assess regularities or explain differences across different
institutional and cultural settings.
Secondly, this analysis is reliant on the assumption that preferences systematically differ between men and
women, and thus changes in the bargaining power of women relative to men affects household resource
allocation decisions. As Doss (2005) points out, although this is an easy way of categorising people, doing so
might ignore differences between members of each gender, such as age, marital status and seniority. Analysis
using these measures would be complicated by the endogeneity of household formation. Collecting further
data that enables researchers to establish the different bargaining positions and consumption preferences of
household members would help develop a more nuanced picture of decision making within the household.
Lastly, this analysis relies on the assumption that LRAD’s grant transfers resulted in female beneficiaries
gaining substantive and enforceable rights in land, thus improving their intrafamilial bargaining position.
But as Hart, Chandia and Jacobs (2018) point out, whether this is the case might depend on ex-ante gender
dynamics and whether contracts can be practically enforced. Further research needs to be conducted to
understand whether the the transfer of formal rights in land translate into control.
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9 Tables and Figures
Figure 3: Men’s versus women’s total land grants
Figure 4: Men’s versus women’s total land grants (less than R 200 000)
Note - For clarity, this figure presents only the observations in Figure 3 where both
Gm and Gw are less than R200 000.
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Figure 5: Men’s versus women’s total land grants
Table 3: Women’s share of total household grants:
Values across sample
Share is %
0 26.5
Between 0 and 0.5 17.8
0.5 24.9
Between 0.5 and 1 8.9
1 21.9
Total 100.0
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Table 4: Household composition: Resident adults
Men
Women 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total %
1 17 7 4 1 1 0 0 31
2 9 8 6 2 2 1 1 28
3 5 5 5 3 3 1 0 22
4 3 3 3 1 1 1 0 13
5 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 7
Total % 35 24 19 9 9 3 1 100
Note- Table presents a cross tabulation of the number
of resident men and women in households. Frequency of
distribution in each cell expressed as percentages.
Table 5: Household composition: Grant applicants
Men
Women 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total %
0 0 25 1 0 0 0 27
1 18 23 7 1 2 0 51
2 4 4 2 2 2 0 14
3 0 1 1 2 1 1 6
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total % 22 54 12 5 4 2 100
Note- Table presents a cross tabulation (cell percentages)
of the number of male and female grant applicants across
households.
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Table 6: Linear Income Effects: System of Demand Functions without Distribution Factors
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
Grains Fruit & Veg Sugar Meat Other Food Alc. & Tob. Hygiene Transport Child Clothes Adult Clothes Fuel Healthcare Schooling Other non-food
ln (y/n) -0.0563*** -0.0238*** -0.0131*** -0.0270*** -0.0151*** -0.00529** -0.0107*** 0.0443*** -0.00445*** -0.00112 -0.00386** 0.00194* 0.00645*** 0.0994***
(-19.16) (-13.46) (-14.70) (-9.07) (-5.87) (-2.18) (-5.29) (9.19) (-3.47) (-1.02) (-2.55) (1.70) (2.62) (16.94)
Number of women -0.000257 -0.00120 0.000123 -0.00427** -0.00289* -0.00366** -0.000154 0.00210 0.000124 -0.000996 -0.000994 -0.000940 0.00449*** 0.00824**
(-0.14) (-1.06) (0.22) (-2.25) (-1.76) (-2.36) (-0.12) (0.68) (0.15) (-1.42) (-1.03) (-1.29) (2.86) (2.20)
Number of men -0.00590*** -0.00393*** -0.00193*** -0.00311* -0.00331** 0.00353*** -0.00198* 0.00580** -0.00202*** 0.00250*** -0.00184** 0.000394 0.00151 0.00972***
(-3.55) (-3.94) (-3.85) (-1.85) (-2.29) (2.58) (-1.73) (2.13) (-2.78) (4.03) (-2.15) (0.61) (1.09) (2.93)
r2 0.51 0.29 0.40 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.09 0.17 0.40
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1123
Note - Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from SUR estimation of the household demand system are presented. Dependant variables are the inverse
monotonic sine transformation of the budget shares for the 14 goods categories, described in detail in table 13. Explanatory variables are listed on the left and include the
number of male and female residents along with ln(y/n), which is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of monthly per capita expenditure. Higher order expenditures,
distribution factors and grant terms are not included in this specification. All demographic, household and LRAD-specific characteristics as described in section 6 (full list in
sections B and C of table 14) are controlled for but coefficients are not presented.
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.48
Table 7: Higher Order Income Effects: System of Demand Functions without Distribution Factors
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
Grains Fruit & Veg. Sugar Meat Other Food Alc. & Tob. Hygiene Transport Child Clothes Adult Clothes Fuel Healthcare Schooling Other non-foods
ln (y/n) -0.158*** -0.0118 -0.0276*** 0.0307+ 0.0436*** -0.0144 -0.0138 0.140*** -0.0327*** 0.00326 0.0103 -0.00143 -0.0314* 0.0749*
(-8.25) (-1.01) (-4.73) (1.57) (2.59) (-0.90) (-1.03) (4.41) (-3.89) (0.45) (1.03) (-0.19) (-1.94) (1.94)
ln (y/n)2 0.00856*** -0.00101 0.00123** -0.00486*** -0.00494*** 0.000767 0.000260 -0.00804*** 0.00238*** -0.000370 -0.00119 0.000284 0.00319** 0.00206
(5.37) (-1.04) (2.52) (-2.99) (-3.53) (0.58) (0.23) (-3.04) (3.40) (-0.61) (-1.44) (0.45) (2.37) (0.64)
Number of women -0.000702 -0.00114 0.0000594 -0.00402** -0.00263+ -0.00370** -0.000167 0.00252 0.000000400 -0.000977 -0.000931 -0.000954 0.00432*** 0.00813**
(-0.38) (-1.01) (0.10) (-2.12) (-1.61) (-2.39) (-0.13) (0.82) (0.00) (-1.39) (-0.96) (-1.31) (2.76) (2.17)
Number of men -0.00656*** -0.00385*** -0.00203*** -0.00274+ -0.00293** 0.00347** -0.00200* 0.00643** -0.00220*** 0.00252*** -0.00175** 0.000372 0.00127 0.00955***
(-4.00) (-3.85) (-4.04) (-1.63) (-2.02) (2.53) (-1.74) (2.36) (-3.05) (4.06) (-2.04) (0.58) (0.91) (2.87)
χ2(2) 405.47 182.49 223.63 91.85 47.30 5.10 28.09 94.41 23.72 1.42 8.57 3.11 12.54 287.36
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.00
Observations 1123
Note - Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from SUR estimation of the household demand system are presented. Dependant variables are the inverse
monotonic sine transformations of the budget shares for the 14 goods categories, described in detail in table 13. Explanatory variables are listed on the left, include the
number of male and female residents along with ln(y/n), the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of monthly per capita expenditure, and it’s square. The third last row
reports the test of joint significance of the two per capita expenditure terms. Each tests’ respective p-value is also presented. All demographic, household and LRAD-specific
characteristics as described in section 6 (full list in sections B and C of table 14) are controlled for but coefficients are not presented.
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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Table 8: Effect of Grant Income on Household Demand
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
Grains Fruit & Veg. Sugar Meat Other Food Alc. & Tob. Hygiene Transport Child Clothes Adult Clothes Fuel Healthcare Schooling Other non-foods
lnGm -0.000634 -0.000254 -0.000131 -0.00162*** -0.000280 -0.0000342 0.000405 0.00105 0.0000104 -0.000262+ -0.000358+ 0.0000924 0.000409 0.00156*
(-1.38) (-0.90) (-0.93) (-3.45) (-0.69) (-0.09) (1.25) (1.36) (0.05) (-1.50) (-1.48) (0.51) (1.05) (1.66)
lnGw -0.000206 -0.000662** -0.000175 -0.00127** -0.000859* 0.000579 0.000000371 0.000851 -0.000195 -0.000350* -0.000255 0.000571*** 0.00101** 0.000952
(-0.38) (-2.01) (-1.05) (-2.31) (-1.80) (1.28) (0.00) (0.95) (-0.82) (-1.71) (-0.90) (2.68) (2.21) (0.87)
Transfer 0.0193*** 0.00817** 0.00220 0.00207 0.00537 -0.00962** 0.00188 -0.0143+ -0.00699*** -0.00286 -0.00167 0.00129 -0.0134*** 0.00787
(3.33) (2.31) (1.23) (0.35) (1.05) (-1.98) (0.46) (-1.48) (-2.73) (-1.30) (-0.55) (0.56) (-2.74) (0.67)
ln (y/n) -0.163*** -0.0146 -0.0285*** 0.0272 0.0411** -0.0116 -0.0139 0.145*** -0.0315*** 0.00320 0.0100 -0.000890 -0.0269* 0.0758*
(-8.54) (-1.26) (-4.86) (1.40) (2.44) (-0.73) (-1.04) (4.57) (-3.74) (0.44) (1.00) (-0.12) (-1.67) (1.96)
ln (y/n)2 0.00898*** -0.000763 0.00130*** -0.00454*** -0.00472*** 0.000524 0.000263 -0.00848*** 0.00228*** -0.000358 -0.00117 0.000230 0.00279** 0.00197
(5.66) (-0.79) (2.67) (-2.80) (-3.36) (0.39) (0.24) (-3.21) (3.25) (-0.59) (-1.40) (0.37) (2.08) (0.61)
Number of women -0.000531 -0.00113 0.0000908 -0.00342* -0.00261+ -0.00358** -0.000357 0.00220 0.0000110 -0.000879 -0.000787 -0.000948 0.00430*** 0.00749**
(-0.29) (-1.00) (0.16) (-1.81) (-1.59) (-2.30) (-0.27) (0.71) (0.01) (-1.25) (-0.81) (-1.30) (2.74) (1.98)
Number of men -0.00601*** -0.00315*** -0.00182*** -0.00117 -0.00209 0.00292** -0.00211* 0.00527* -0.00212*** 0.00286*** -0.00145+ -0.000108 0.000186 0.00837**
(-3.52) (-3.03) (-3.48) (-0.67) (-1.39) (2.04) (-1.76) (1.86) (-2.81) (4.42) (-1.62) (-0.16) (0.13) (2.41)
Unitary test χ2(25) = 40.671 [p-value = .02]
Proportionality test χ2(13) = 4.889 [p-value = .96]
Observations 1123
Note - Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from SUR estimation of the household demand system are presented. Dependant variables are the inverse
monotonic sine transformation of the budget shares for the 14 goods categories, described in detail in table 13. Explanatory variables are listed on the left and include the
number of male and female residents along with ln(y/n), which is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of monthly per capita expenditure. All demographic, household
and LRAD-specific characteristics as described in section 6 (full list in sections B and C of table 14) are controlled for but coefficients are not presented.
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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Table 9: Tests for Unitary and Collective Rationality: Effect of Distribution Factors on Household Demand
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
Grains Fruit & Veg. Sugar Meat Other Food Alc. & Tob. Hygiene Transport Child Clothes Adult Clothes Fuel Healthcare Schooling Other Non-Foods
Transfer × lnGw 0.000428 -0.0000109 -0.00000474 -0.00131+ 0.000199 0.000517 -0.000366 0.00107 -0.0000234 0.000217 -0.000657+ -0.000135 -0.000686 0.000852
(0.49) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-1.48) (0.26) (0.71) (-0.60) (0.74) (-0.06) (0.66) (-1.45) (-0.40) (-0.94) (0.48)
Transfer × lnGm 0.00159* 0.000321 0.000455+ 0.000229 0.0000925 0.00179** -0.000550 -0.000894 0.000961** 0.000611* -0.000407 -0.000337 -0.000392 -0.00320+
(1.65) (0.54) (1.53) (0.23) (0.11) (2.21) (-0.81) (-0.56) (2.26) (1.66) (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.48) (-1.63)
lnGw -0.000789 -0.000250 -0.000129 -0.00115** -0.000352 -0.000221 0.000538 0.000657 0.0000195 -0.000340+ -0.000120 0.000141 0.000657 0.00124
(-1.42) (-0.74) (-0.75) (-2.02) (-0.71) (-0.47) (1.37) (0.71) (0.08) (-1.61) (-0.41) (0.64) (1.39) (1.10)
lnGm -0.000777 -0.000777** -0.000338* -0.00135** -0.000893+ -0.0000619 0.000198 0.00117 -0.000539* -0.000569** -0.000107 0.000692*** 0.00115** 0.00209+
(-1.21) (-1.98) (-1.71) (-2.06) (-1.57) (-0.12) (0.44) (1.09) (-1.91) (-2.34) (-0.32) (2.74) (2.12) (1.60)
Transfer 0.00161 0.00540 -0.00181 0.0106 0.00293 -0.0297** 0.00975 -0.0150 -0.0154** -0.0101* 0.00728 0.00539 -0.00436 0.0294
(0.12) (0.64) (-0.43) (0.76) (0.24) (-2.57) (1.00) (-0.65) (-2.52) (-1.92) (1.01) (0.99) (-0.37) (1.05)
ln (y/n) -0.165*** -0.0150 -0.0291*** 0.0267 0.0410** -0.0139 -0.0132 0.146*** -0.0327*** 0.00242 0.0105 -0.000461 -0.0265+ 0.0802**
(-8.64) (-1.29) (-4.96) (1.37) (2.43) (-0.87) (-0.98) (4.60) (-3.90) (0.33) (1.05) (-0.06) (-1.64) (2.07)
ln (y/n)2 0.00914*** -0.000727 0.00135*** -0.00448*** -0.00471*** 0.000707 0.000211 -0.00860*** 0.00238*** -0.000297 -0.00119 0.000196 0.00277** 0.00160
(5.75) (-0.75) (2.76) (-2.76) (-3.35) (0.53) (0.19) (-3.25) (3.40) (-0.49) (-1.43) (0.31) (2.06) (0.50)
Number of men -0.00570*** -0.00310*** -0.00175*** -0.00123 -0.00206 0.00326** -0.00223* 0.00520* -0.00196*** 0.00298*** -0.00157* -0.000175 0.0000665 0.00789**
(-3.33) (-2.96) (-3.32) (-0.70) (-1.36) (2.27) (-1.85) (1.82) (-2.59) (4.58) (-1.74) (-0.26) (0.05) (2.27)
Number of women -0.000638 -0.00116 0.0000553 -0.00349* -0.00261+ -0.00370** -0.000329 0.00231 -0.0000647 -0.000918 -0.000782 -0.000927 0.00430*** 0.00777**
(-0.34) (-1.02) (0.10) (-1.85) (-1.59) (-2.38) (-0.25) (0.75) (-0.08) (-1.30) (-0.80) (-1.27) (2.74) (2.06)
Unitary test χ2(25) = 44.828 [p-value = .017]
Proportionality test χ2(13) = 2.984 [p-value = 1]
Observations 1123
Note - Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from SUR estimation of the household demand system are presented. The demand system is as eqn. 8. Dependant
variables are the inverse monotonic sine transformations of the budget shares for the 14 goods categories, described in detail in table 13. Explanatory variables are listed on the
left, and include the two interaction-term distribution factors: Ti lnGw and Ti lnGm along with the the components of these terms (lnGm, lnGw and Ti), terms for household
per capita expenditure and its square (ln (y/n) and ln (y/n)2), terms for the number of male and female residents, detailed descriptions of which can be found in section A of
table 14 of the appendix. Nonlinear Wald tests of the joint significance of the distribution factors’ correlations (the test for unitary rationality) and for the joint significance
of the ratio of the distribution factors’ correlations (the proportionality test) are also presented. Each test’s respective p-value is also presented. All demographic, household
and LRAD-specific characteristics as described in section 6 (full list in sections B and C of table 14)are controlled for but coefficients are not presented (full estimates are
presented in table 12.
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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Table 10: Higher Order Effects of Distribution Factors
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
Grains Fruit & Veg Sugar Meat Other Food Alcohol & Tobacco Hygiene Transport Child Clothing Adult Clothing Fuel Healthcare Schooling Other Non-Foods
Transfer × lnGm -0.00727 0.000313 -0.00294+ 0.00721 0.000494 0.00991* -0.00276 -0.00181 0.000785 -0.00131 0.00367 -0.00528** -0.00879+ 0.00568
(-1.12) (0.08) (-1.48) (1.09) (0.09) (1.83) (-0.61) (-0.17) (0.28) (-0.53) (1.08) (-2.08) (-1.61) (0.43)
(Transfer × lnGm)2 -0.00122* -0.000428 -0.000303+ -0.000873 -0.000147 0.0000351 -0.000350 0.00214** -0.0000137 -0.000176 0.000294 -0.000633** -0.000671 0.00211+
(-1.91) (-1.10) (-1.55) (-1.34) (-0.26) (0.07) (-0.78) (2.02) (-0.05) (-0.73) (0.88) (-2.52) (-1.25) (1.63)
Transfer × lnGw 0.0139* 0.00489 0.00328+ 0.00907 0.00190 0.000557 0.00352 -0.0235** 0.000125 0.00212 -0.00380 0.00685** 0.00655 -0.0228+
(1.93) (1.11) (1.49) (1.24) (0.30) (0.09) (0.70) (-1.97) (0.04) (0.78) (-1.01) (2.42) (1.08) (-1.56)
(Transfer × lnGw)2 0.000796 0.0000148 0.000299* -0.000567 -0.0000294 -0.000695+ 0.000200 0.00000778 0.0000154 0.000170 -0.000358 0.000443** 0.000739+ -0.000827
(1.43) (0.04) (1.75) (-1.00) (-0.06) (-1.49) (0.51) (0.01) (0.06) (0.80) (-1.23) (2.02) (1.57) (-0.73)
r2 0.53 0.30 0.41 0.28 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.41
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1123
Note - Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from SUR estimation of household demand system are presented. Dependant variables are the inverse monotonic
sine transformation of the budget shares for 14 goods, described in detail in table 13. Explanatory variables listed on the left are the single and quadratic terms for the two
distribution factors. All demographic, household and LRAD-specific characteristics as described in section 6 (full list in sections B and C of table 14) are controlled for but
coefficients are not presented.
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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Table 11: Z -conditional Demand System and Test for Collective Rationality with Male Distribution Factor
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
Grains Fruit & Veg. Sugar Meat Other food Alc. & Tob. Hygiene Transport Child Clothes Fuel Adult Clothes Schooling Other non-foods
ln(budget share of 2.427 2.935 1.811 15.77 -0.0237 -4.405 4.479 -15.03 0.782 6.523 -1.804 5.516 -19.88
healthcare) (0.20) (0.27) (0.28) (0.31) (-0.00) (-0.28) (0.30) (-0.31) (0.18) (0.31) (-0.27) (0.30) (-0.31)
Transfer × lnGm 0.00172 0.00120 0.000945 0.00559 0.000113 0.000195 0.000909 -0.00540 0.00111 0.00188 -0.00000219 0.00146 -0.00942
(0.42) (0.33) (0.44) (0.33) (0.05) (0.04) (0.18) (-0.33) (0.78) (0.27) (-0.00) (0.24) (-0.44)
Transfer -0.00205 -0.00634 -0.00892 -0.0669 0.00565 -0.00591 -0.0123 0.0557 -0.0185 -0.0267 -0.000411 -0.0344 0.118
(-0.04) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.31) (0.18) (-0.09) (-0.19) (0.27) (-1.01) (-0.30) (-0.01) (-0.43) (0.43)
Proportionality test χ2(12) = 1.765 [p-value = 1]
Observations 1125
Note - Coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from 3SLS estimation of the household demand system are presented. Dependant variables are the inverse
monotonic sine transformation of the budget shares for the 12 remaining goods, described in detail in table 13. Instrument for healthcare budget share is distribution factor
TilnGw. Wald tests of the joint significance of distribution factors Ti lnGw correlations in the z-conditional demand system (the collective rationality test). Each tests’
respective p-value is also presented. All demographic, household and LRAD-specific characteristics as described in section 6 (full list in sections B and C of table 14) are
controlled for but coefficients are not presented.
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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Appendix
Table 12: Effect of Distribution Factors on Household Demand (Table 9 with reported control estimates)
Dependant Variable: ln(budget share of ...)
G & C F & V. Su M OF A& T Hy T CC AC F H E ONF
Transfer × lnGw 0.00043 -0.000011 -0.0000047 -0.0013+ 0.00020 0.00052 -0.00037 0.0011 -0.000023 0.00022 -0.00066+ -0.00013 -0.00069 0.00085
(0.49) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-1.48) (0.26) (0.71) (-0.60) (0.74) (-0.06) (0.66) (-1.45) (-0.40) (-0.94) (0.48)
Transfer × lnGm 0.0016* 0.00032 0.00045+ 0.00023 0.000093 0.0018** -0.00055 -0.00089 0.00096** 0.00061* -0.00041 -0.00034 -0.00039 -0.0032+
(1.65) (0.54) (1.53) (0.23) (0.11) (2.21) (-0.81) (-0.56) (2.26) (1.66) (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.48) (-1.63)
lnGw -0.00079 -0.00025 -0.00013 -0.0011** -0.00035 -0.00022 0.00054 0.00066 0.000020 -0.00034+ -0.00012 0.00014 0.00066 0.0012
(-1.42) (-0.74) (-0.75) (-2.02) (-0.71) (-0.47) (1.37) (0.71) (0.08) (-1.61) (-0.41) (0.64) (1.39) (1.10)
lnGm -0.00078 -0.00078** -0.00034* -0.0014** -0.00089+ -0.000062 0.00020 0.0012 -0.00054* -0.00057** -0.00011 0.00069*** 0.0012** 0.0021+
(-1.21) (-1.98) (-1.71) (-2.06) (-1.57) (-0.12) (0.44) (1.09) (-1.91) (-2.34) (-0.32) (2.74) (2.12) (1.60)
Transfer 0.0016 0.0054 -0.0018 0.011 0.0029 -0.030** 0.0097 -0.015 -0.015** -0.010* 0.0073 0.0054 -0.0044 0.029
(0.12) (0.64) (-0.43) (0.76) (0.24) (-2.57) (1.00) (-0.65) (-2.52) (-1.92) (1.01) (0.99) (-0.37) (1.05)
ln (y/n) -0.16*** -0.015 -0.029*** 0.027 0.041** -0.014 -0.013 0.15*** -0.033*** 0.0024 0.010 -0.00046 -0.026+ 0.080**
(-8.64) (-1.29) (-4.96) (1.37) (2.43) (-0.87) (-0.98) (4.60) (-3.90) (0.33) (1.05) (-0.06) (-1.64) (2.07)
ln (y/n)2 0.0091*** -0.00073 0.0013*** -0.0045*** -0.0047*** 0.00071 0.00021 -0.0086*** 0.0024*** -0.00030 -0.0012 0.00020 0.0028** 0.0016
(5.75) (-0.75) (2.76) (-2.76) (-3.35) (0.53) (0.19) (-3.25) (3.40) (-0.49) (-1.43) (0.31) (2.06) (0.50)
Number of men -0.0057*** -0.0031*** -0.0017*** -0.0012 -0.0021 0.0033** -0.0022* 0.0052* -0.0020*** 0.0030*** -0.0016* -0.00018 0.000066 0.0079**
(-3.33) (-2.96) (-3.32) (-0.70) (-1.36) (2.27) (-1.85) (1.82) (-2.59) (4.58) (-1.74) (-0.26) (0.05) (2.27)
Number of women -0.00064 -0.0012 0.000055 -0.0035* -0.0026+ -0.0037** -0.00033 0.0023 -0.000065 -0.00092 -0.00078 -0.00093 0.0043*** 0.0078**
(-0.34) (-1.02) (0.10) (-1.85) (-1.59) (-2.38) (-0.25) (0.75) (-0.08) (-1.30) (-0.80) (-1.27) (2.74) (2.06)
Girls age 0-5 -0.0060** -0.0036* -0.0026*** -0.0045+ 0.0026 -0.0046* -0.0018 0.0071 -0.00083 -0.00046 0.00063 0.0011 -0.0065** 0.018***
(-2.00) (-1.95) (-2.82) (-1.47) (0.97) (-1.83) (-0.86) (1.42) (-0.63) (-0.40) (0.40) (0.92) (-2.57) (2.98)
Girls age 6-12 -0.0072*** -0.0026+ -0.0026*** 0.0015 -0.00021 -0.0020 0.000082 0.0037 0.0026** 0.00013 -0.0012 0.0011 0.0065*** -0.00017
(-2.61) (-1.54) (-3.03) (0.54) (-0.09) (-0.86) (0.04) (0.81) (2.16) (0.13) (-0.84) (1.06) (2.80) (-0.03)
Girls age 13-18 -0.0030 -0.0051*** -0.00091 -0.0031 -0.0051* -0.0031 -0.0021 0.0093* 0.0040*** -0.0024** 0.0017 0.0019+ 0.0021 0.0047
(-0.93) (-2.60) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-1.80) (-1.16) (-0.94) (1.74) (2.87) (-1.99) (1.03) (1.52) (0.77) (0.72)
Boys age 0-5 -0.0024 -0.0060*** -0.0020** -0.0049* -0.0016 0.0031 -0.0043** 0.0065 -0.0012 -0.0022** -0.00023 -0.0012 -0.0021 0.018***
(-0.89) (-3.60) (-2.40) (-1.76) (-0.65) (1.35) (-2.27) (1.42) (-1.01) (-2.17) (-0.16) (-1.11) (-0.89) (3.24)
Boys age 6-12 -0.0022 -0.0027* -0.00051 -0.0017 0.00017 -0.00077 0.00055 0.0016 -0.00047 0.00038 -0.0013 0.00093 -0.0021 0.0070
(-0.81) (-1.65) (-0.61) (-0.63) (0.07) (-0.34) (0.29) (0.37) (-0.40) (0.37) (-0.92) (0.88) (-0.92) (1.29)
Boys age 13-18 -0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0016* 0.0043+ -0.0012 -0.0037+ -0.00052 -0.0017 0.0036*** -0.0024** 0.0070*** -0.00083 0.0060** -0.0061
(-0.58) (-0.69) (-1.84) (1.47) (-0.46) (-1.52) (-0.26) (-0.35) (2.86) (-2.17) (4.66) (-0.74) (2.48) (-1.05)
Share of women: 0.0063 0.0065 -0.0044 0.011 -0.0061 0.0075 -0.0074 0.017 -0.0029 -0.00099 -0.0030 0.0054 -0.022*** -0.0072
casual labourers (0.63) (1.07) (-1.43) (1.08) (-0.68) (0.89) (-1.05) (1.00) (-0.65) (-0.26) (-0.57) (1.38) (-2.59) (-0.35)
Share of men: -0.0018 0.0076 -0.0046+ 0.015+ 0.013+ 0.0040 0.012* 0.0030 0.0054 -0.0030 -0.0021 0.0051 -0.021*** -0.031+
Casual labourers (-0.19) (1.34) (-1.60) (1.58) (1.63) (0.52) (1.89) (0.19) (1.31) (-0.86) (-0.44) (1.39) (-2.72) (-1.63)
Share of women: -0.010 -0.00057 -0.0021 -0.0085 -0.0046 -0.00049 0.0093* -0.019 0.0020 0.0021 0.0024 0.0014 0.0011 0.026+
Wage labourers (-1.28) (-0.12) (-0.88) (-1.05) (-0.66) (-0.07) (1.68) (-1.44) (0.57) (0.69) (0.57) (0.44) (0.16) (1.63)
Share of men: -0.0064 -0.0028 -0.0024 0.0017 0.0054 -0.0010 0.0084* 0.010 -0.0011 -0.00042 0.0038 -0.00094 -0.021*** 0.0068
Wage labourers (-0.98) (-0.71) (-1.18) (0.26) (0.94) (-0.19) (1.82) (0.92) (-0.39) (-0.17) (1.10) (-0.37) (-3.75) (0.51)
Share of women: 0.0081 0.0054 0.0054* 0.0035 0.012 -0.00012 0.0092 -0.038** -0.0027 0.0022 0.0051 -0.0024 -0.022** 0.015
Wage labourers (0.78) (0.85) (1.70) (0.33) (1.28) (-0.01) (1.27) (-2.23) (-0.59) (0.55) (0.94) (-0.58) (-2.49) (0.72)
Share of men: -0.0067 0.0082 -0.0027 -0.00026 0.0027 -0.013+ 0.0069 0.044*** -0.00013 -0.0075** 0.0011 0.0040 -0.017** -0.018
Self-employed (-0.68) (1.37) (-0.91) (-0.03) (0.31) (-1.55) (0.99) (2.69) (-0.03) (-2.00) (0.22) (1.03) (-2.06) (-0.87)
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Table 12 continued: Effect of Distribution Factors on Household Demand (Table 9 with reported control estimates)
Share of women: 0.011 -0.0065 0.0068*** 0.0069 -0.012* 0.0030 -0.0029 -0.00069 0.0037 -0.0016 -0.0082* 0.0068** 0.015** -0.020
Married (1.36) (-1.27) (2.63) (0.80) (-1.65) (0.42) (-0.48) (-0.05) (1.00) (-0.50) (-1.85) (2.06) (2.12) (-1.15)
Share of women: -0.0045 -0.00010 -0.0031 0.012 0.0096 -0.0034 -0.011* 0.0028 -0.00073 0.0089*** 0.0042 -0.0053+ -0.0087 -0.00095
Married (-0.52) (-0.02) (-1.17) (1.31) (1.26) (-0.47) (-1.73) (0.20) (-0.19) (2.70) (0.93) (-1.56) (-1.19) (-0.05)
Share of women: 0.0025 -0.0016 0.0014* -0.00059 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0054 -0.00080 -0.00086 0.000028 0.00059 0.0010 0.0097*
With primary school (0.98) (-0.98) (1.76) (-0.22) (-1.08) (-1.16) (-0.82) (-1.24) (-0.70) (-0.87) (0.02) (0.58) (0.47) (1.83)
Share of men: -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0018 0.0092 -0.0049 -0.014** 0.0074+ 0.026** 0.0029 0.0014 -0.0035 0.00010 0.0045 -0.023+
With primary school (-0.22) (-0.33) (-0.82) (1.25) (-0.77) (-2.36) (1.45) (2.18) (0.93) (0.52) (-0.93) (0.04) (0.74) (-1.60)
Date of interview 0.00065*** 0.00011+ 0.000074** -0.000030 0.00028*** -0.00028*** -0.000041 -0.00051*** -0.00017*** -0.0000053 -0.000086+ -0.000048 -0.00020** 0.00022
(6.04) (1.61) (2.23) (-0.27) (2.95) (-3.07) (-0.55) (-2.84) (-3.62) (-0.13) (-1.52) (-1.14) (-2.22) (1.01)
Afrikaans -0.0015 0.014 -0.0065 -0.037+ -0.021 0.0075 -0.0051 0.086** 0.0089 0.0057 0.0025 -0.030*** -0.012 -0.017
(-0.06) (0.97) (-0.90) (-1.54) (-0.99) (0.38) (-0.31) (2.18) (0.85) (0.63) (0.20) (-3.16) (-0.61) (-0.35)
IsiXhosa 0.0062 -0.023* 0.012* -0.066*** -0.055*** 0.0043 -0.057*** 0.11*** 0.0030 -0.0064 -0.0078 -0.035*** -0.0073 0.11**
(0.30) (-1.82) (1.92) (-3.11) (-3.01) (0.25) (-3.90) (3.29) (0.32) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-4.28) (-0.41) (2.55)
IsiZulu 0.035+ -0.012 -0.0094+ -0.025 -0.0082 0.0014 -0.034** 0.11*** 0.019** 0.011 0.013 -0.027*** -0.0062 -0.066+
(1.64) (-0.91) (-1.44) (-1.14) (-0.44) (0.08) (-2.30) (3.07) (2.03) (1.39) (1.16) (-3.26) (-0.35) (-1.53)
Setswana 0.0094 0.011 -0.0077 0.013 -0.038* -0.012 0.0090 0.057+ 0.013 0.0086 0.012 -0.030*** 0.0033 -0.050
(0.40) (0.76) (-1.08) (0.53) (-1.85) (-0.63) (0.55) (1.46) (1.27) (0.97) (1.02) (-3.25) (0.17) (-1.05)
Sesotho 0.025 0.00092 -0.011+ -0.0088 -0.049** -0.0065 0.0041 0.032 0.015 0.0077 0.012 -0.027*** 0.0052 -0.0016
(1.07) (0.06) (-1.51) (-0.36) (-2.31) (-0.33) (0.24) (0.80) (1.41) (0.86) (0.95) (-2.94) (0.26) (-0.03)
SePedi -0.077*** -0.020 -0.015* 0.012 -0.056** 0.011 0.011 0.10** 0.022* 0.017+ 0.019 -0.030*** 0.0057 -0.0025
(-2.75) (-1.16) (-1.73) (0.41) (-2.28) (0.47) (0.56) (2.16) (1.80) (1.57) (1.31) (-2.71) (0.24) (-0.04)
SiSwati -0.026 0.046** -0.030*** -0.028 0.090*** -0.019 -0.069*** 0.11** 0.0080 -0.0071 -0.011 -0.019+ -0.00022 -0.046
(-0.83) (2.47) (-3.17) (-0.89) (3.32) (-0.75) (-3.17) (2.18) (0.59) (-0.61) (-0.66) (-1.59) (-0.01) (-0.73)
Xitsonga -0.12*** -0.014 -0.029** 0.042 -0.023 -0.017 -0.012 0.042 0.032* 0.020 0.011 -0.035** 0.0068 0.10
(-2.85) (-0.51) (-2.22) (0.96) (-0.60) (-0.46) (-0.41) (0.58) (1.70) (1.24) (0.47) (-2.04) (0.19) (1.15)
Mpumalanga -0.077*** -0.0087 -0.012+ 0.0021 -0.044** 0.017 0.050*** -0.087** 0.023** 0.023** 0.0029 0.00079 0.026 0.083+
(-3.06) (-0.57) (-1.49) (0.08) (-1.96) (0.80) (2.84) (-2.07) (2.04) (2.42) (0.22) (0.08) (1.21) (1.63)
North West -0.082*** -0.022* -0.0097+ -0.029 -0.013 0.027+ 0.055*** -0.072** 0.024*** 0.011 -0.0017 0.00066 0.014 0.10**
(-3.97) (-1.72) (-1.53) (-1.38) (-0.73) (1.59) (3.82) (-2.08) (2.61) (1.38) (-0.15) (0.08) (0.79) (2.46)
Gauteng -0.075*** -0.024** -0.0092+ 0.030+ 0.0047 0.0069 0.055*** -0.040 0.025*** 0.0052 -0.011 0.0037 0.040** 0.000065
(-4.06) (-2.09) (-1.61) (1.59) (0.29) (0.44) (4.24) (-1.28) (3.04) (0.74) (-1.15) (0.51) (2.53) (0.00)
Northern Cape -0.081*** -0.040*** -0.00089 0.0020 -0.022 0.0081 0.035** -0.10*** 0.025** 0.011 0.0048 0.0050 0.016 0.14***
(-3.49) (-2.82) (-0.13) (0.08) (-1.08) (0.42) (2.17) (-2.67) (2.46) (1.24) (0.40) (0.55) (0.81) (3.04)
KwaZulu Natal -0.070*** -0.0033 -0.013* -0.018 -0.044** 0.022 0.060*** -0.096** 0.028** 0.015+ 0.023* 0.012 0.037* 0.052
(-2.86) (-0.22) (-1.68) (-0.73) (-2.02) (1.07) (3.50) (-2.35) (2.55) (1.61) (1.81) (1.21) (1.76) (1.05)
Free State -0.12*** -0.025** -0.017*** -0.016 0.013 0.020 0.040*** -0.040 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.012 0.00036 0.014 0.080**
(-6.49) (-2.15) (-2.89) (-0.86) (0.81) (1.31) (3.05) (-1.28) (3.10) (2.68) (1.19) (0.05) (0.87) (2.11)
Western Cape -0.11*** -0.040** -0.021** 0.049* -0.0027 0.028 0.063*** -0.11** 0.046*** 0.012 -0.0032 0.0086 0.017 0.076
(-3.96) (-2.33) (-2.40) (1.72) (-0.11) (1.19) (3.16) (-2.44) (3.70) (1.08) (-0.22) (0.78) (0.71) (1.33)
Eastern Cape -0.041+ 0.011 -0.012+ 0.020 0.0096 0.0031 0.081*** -0.12*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.021+ 0.0064 0.037* -0.061
(-1.56) (0.71) (-1.52) (0.74) (0.41) (0.14) (4.37) (-2.75) (2.67) (2.61) (1.54) (0.61) (1.67) (-1.14)
Application date 0.000024 -0.00038*** 0.0000074 -0.000016 -0.000032+ 0.000026 -0.000020 0.000047 0.000013 0.0000083 0.00000032 -0.0000052 0.000037* -0.000049
(1.03) (-2.68) (1.03) (-0.67) (-1.53) (1.33) (-1.19) (1.21) (1.23) (0.93) (0.03) (-0.57) (1.85) (-1.03)
Heard through -0.0031 -0.0027 0.0021+ 0.0045 -0.0047 -0.0088** -0.0094*** 0.0091 -0.0028 -0.00038 -0.0024 -0.00070 0.0083** 0.010
government official? (-0.65) (-0.95) (1.46) (0.93) (-1.13) (-2.24) (-2.83) (1.17) (-1.38) (-0.21) (-0.98) (-0.38) (2.09) (1.07)
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Table 12 continued: Effect of Distribution Factors on Household Demand (Table 9 with reported control estimates)
Matched contribution? -0.0033 0.0037 0.00014 -0.0078 0.0063 -0.0029 -0.00060 -0.0059 0.0034 0.0015 -0.00080 -0.0043 0.018*** -0.0065
(-0.44) (0.80) (0.06) (-1.00) (0.93) (-0.46) (-0.11) (-0.47) (1.02) (0.51) (-0.20) (-1.43) (2.74) (-0.42)
Moved to join? 0.016** 0.0016 0.0059*** -0.014** -0.000080 0.0013 -0.0000059 -0.010 -0.0010 -0.0036 0.0025 -0.00087 0.016*** -0.014
(2.45) (0.39) (2.87) (-2.01) (-0.01) (0.24) (-0.00) (-0.94) (-0.34) (-1.44) (0.71) (-0.33) (2.92) (-1.05)
Mean farming -0.00014 0.0011** 0.00045** 0.0029*** 0.00081 0.00063 -0.00050 -0.00048 -0.00070** -0.00018 -0.00029 -0.00071** 0.00031 -0.0033**
experience (yrs) (-0.19) (2.55) (2.02) (3.93) (1.26) (1.04) (-0.99) (-0.40) (-2.20) (-0.65) (-0.75) (-2.48) (0.51) (-2.22)
Share of men: -0.0030 -0.00088 -0.00052 0.00065 0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0019 0.00043 -0.00012 0.0081*** -0.00037 -0.0029+ 0.00076
Have farming exp. (-1.32) (-0.64) (-0.75) (0.28) (0.85) (-0.96) (-0.81) (-0.50) (0.44) (-0.14) (6.86) (-0.41) (-1.52) (0.17)
Share of women: 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0013+ -0.0025 -0.0019 0.0016 -0.00032 0.0086* 0.00089 0.000048 -0.0039*** -0.000077 -0.0011 -0.0012
Have farming exp. (1.08) (-1.25) (-1.56) (-0.92) (-0.81) (0.72) (-0.17) (1.92) (0.75) (0.05) (-2.76) (-0.07) (-0.48) (-0.21)
Head age -0.000067 -0.000023 -0.000017 0.00024* 0.00015 -0.00036*** -0.000014 -0.000046 -0.000021 -0.00019*** -0.000029 0.00011** -0.000086 0.00035
(-0.48) (-0.27) (-0.40) (1.69) (1.20) (-3.14) (-0.15) (-0.20) (-0.35) (-3.56) (-0.40) (2.05) (-0.73) (1.24)
Head is a -0.0033 0.0038 -0.000024 -0.0044 -0.0086+ 0.0035 0.0071+ 0.0064 -0.00078 -0.0052** -0.0065** -0.0060** 0.0020 0.011
man? (-0.54) (1.01) (-0.01) (-0.70) (-1.59) (0.69) (1.64) (0.62) (-0.29) (-2.24) (-2.01) (-2.47) (0.39) (0.88)
Education of -0.0011* -0.00017 -0.00066*** -0.0015** 0.00047 -0.00014 -0.00037 -0.000066 0.00068** 0.00024 -0.00019 -0.00047* 0.0012** 0.0019+
head (yrs) (-1.74) (-0.43) (-3.33) (-2.22) (0.82) (-0.26) (-0.83) (-0.06) (2.40) (0.98) (-0.55) (-1.87) (2.27) (1.48)
Mud floor? 0.0080+ 0.0075** 0.0067*** 0.0080+ 0.0032 0.011*** 0.0046 -0.021** 0.0042* 0.0024 0.0015 0.00048 0.0019 -0.037***
(1.54) (2.38) (4.20) (1.50) (0.70) (2.60) (1.25) (-2.38) (1.84) (1.22) (0.56) (0.24) (0.42) (-3.50)
Own homestead? -0.0020 -0.0020 0.00019 0.016*** -0.0024 -0.0081** -0.0075** 0.011 -0.0020 -0.0020 0.0015 -0.00069 0.0070* -0.0089
(-0.43) (-0.71) (0.13) (3.28) (-0.59) (-2.07) (-2.27) (1.42) (-0.98) (-1.12) (0.63) (-0.37) (1.77) (-0.94)
Value of tools 0.0000064 0.000016 0.000018 0.0000065 -0.0000054 0.000035 -0.000058 -0.000011 -0.000020 -0.000039+ 0.000036 0.000036 -0.0000033 0.000091
(0.10) (0.41) (0.89) (0.10) (-0.09) (0.64) (-1.26) (-1.00) (-0.71) (-1.55) (1.04) (1.39) (-0.06) (0.68 )
Contributed 0.0051 0.0041 0.0033** 0.0063 0.0012 -0.0054 -0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0057*** -0.0044* -0.0036* 0.0037 0.0020
livestock? (1.09) (1.43) (2.31) (1.32) (0.30) (-1.36) (-0.85) (-0.24) (-1.11) (-3.19) (-1.80) (-1.95) (0.93) (0.21)
Distance to DLA office 0.000083** -0.0000072 -0.000019+ -0.000047 -0.000026 0.000047 0.000016 -0.000026 0.0000091 0.0000099 -0.000039* 0.000020 -0.000043 0.0000072
(1.97) (-0.28) (-1.46) (-1.10) (-0.70) (1.35) (0.54) (-0.37) (0.49) (0.62) (-1.77) (1.19) (-1.21) (0.08)
Moved × 0.00018 0.000025 0.000090** 0.00020+ 0.000027 0.000099 -0.000044 0.00030 -0.00013** -0.000025 0.00017** 0.000012 -0.00037*** -0.00052*
Distance to DLA office (1.38) (0.31) (2.23) (1.49) (0.23) (0.90) (-0.48) (1.37) (-2.32) (-0.50) (2.54) (0.24) (-3.37) (-1.94)
Constant -0.25 0.051 0.047 0.19 -0.39** 0.59*** 0.17 0.35 0.39*** 0.028 0.14 0.11+ 0.36** -0.74*
(-1.33) (0.44) (0.81) (0.98) (-2.33) (3.70) (1.27) (1.10) (4.61) (0.39) (1.43) (1.53) (2.25) (-1.90)
Unitary test χ2(25) = 44.828 [p-value = .017]
Prop test χ2(13) = 2.984 [p-value = 1]
Observations 1123
Note - table presents coefficent estimates and t-statistics (in parenthesis) from SUR estimation for the same specification reported in table 9, but also reports coefficients for all controls
which are described in detail in table 14.The base of category of language variable is English, and the base category of the province variable is Limpopo. Dependant variables are the
inverse monotonic sine transformation of the budget shares for the 14 goods categories and presented in the same order as in table 9, titles abbreviated for formatting purposes (G&C =
Grains and Cereals; F&V = Fruit and Vegetables; Su = Sugar; OF = Other Food; M = Meat; A&T = Alcohol and Tobacco; Hy = Hygiene; T = Transport; KC = Children’s clothing;
Adult Clothing; F = Fuel; H = Healthcare; E = Schooling; ONF = Other non foods).
+ p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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Table 13: Expenditure items within goods categories
Goods category Items included
Grains and cereals Maize grain, mealie meal, rice, bread, wheat flour and breakfast cereal.
Fruit and vegetables Potatoes, tomatoes, sweet potatoes, carrots, beet roots, onions and
other roots, pumpkin, squash, green vegetables, tinned vegetables,
bananas, apples, peaches, citrus and tinned fruit.
Meat and meat products Mutton, beef, pork, goat meat, tinned meat, polony, chicken, eggs,
mopani worms, seafood and tinned fish.
Sugar Sugar.
Other food Vegetable oil, peanuts, peanut butter, other nuts, margarine and butter,
cheese, jam, milk, baby formula, soft food and other food expenditure.
Alcohol and tobacco Alcohol and tobacco.
Entertainment and hygiene Entertainment expenses (cinema, music, gambling, lotto), soap, cos-
metics, shampoo, newspapers and books.
Transport costs Petrol, bus, taxi and other transport costs.
Fuel Wood, paraffin, charcoal, coal, candles, gas, purchasing/charging bat-
teries and diesel oil.
Child clothes Shoes and clothes for children.
Adult clothes Shoes and clothes for adults.
Education expenses University, college and school fees, books and uniforms, and other
school expenses.
Healthcare Medical aid, dentists, doctors and nurses, hospital and clinic fees,
medical supplies and traditional healer’s fees.
Other non-food Kitchen equipment, pots, pans, lamps, torches, home maintenance,
bedding, sheets, blankets, towels, furniture and other appliances, life
insurance, funeral policies, medical aid, short term insurance and other
items.
Note - Table displays the expenditure items that are included in each goods category. Items are an exhaustive list of those
reported in the Expenditure, Consumption and Saving module of the 2005 Quality of Life survey household questionnaire. All
expenditure expressed in 2005 ZAR prices, with prices deflated where interview was conducted in later years. For food items,
expenditure is the reported value of purchases of item in the last month. Value of items gifted, received or produced (which
are reported for some items) are not included in calculations. Food goods categories are calculated as the sum of monthly
expenditures on each item within category. Where a non-food item is reported as monthly expenditure (items within alcohol and
tobacco, transport, fuel, and entertainment and hygiene categories) the goods category is also calculated as the sum across values
of items. Remaining non-food goods categories contain items expressed in terms of annual expenditure. Where appropriate, item
expenditure is first divided by 12 before aggregating total expenditure for the goods category. Monthly household expenditure is
calculated as the sum of all goods categories. Budget shares are calculated by dividing the value of the goods category by the
monthly household expenditure. Demand systems are estimated using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the budget
shares.
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Table 14: Variable Descriptions
A. Key variables
Post transfer indicator (T) Indicator taking on the value of one if the household had received transfer of individual land grants from the DLA. This was
established from whether the household was administered a survey for ‘beneficiary’ or ‘control’ households, the former only being
administered if any member of the household had received a grant transfer from the DLA. Where household appeared in beneficiary
group, but individuals had yet to receive individual grant transfers, the indicator was set as zero.
Total value of land grants applied for by
men (Gm)
Aggregate of individual land grants applied for by adult men. Values taken from responses to question in household roster asking
the value of the each land grant applied for by an individual. Where values are missing, the value of the land grant applied for is
considered zero, and individual is not considered a grant applicant. If all amounts for men within the household are reported as
missing, then the household is dropped from the sample.
Total value of land grants applied for by
women (Gw)
Gw is constructed identically to Gm, but for resident women.
Monthly household expenditure (y) Total monthly expenditure y (in 2005 ZAR) computed as the total spending on all goods categories listed in table 13.
Household Size (n) Number of individuals (of all ages) listed in the household roster.
Monthly household per capita expendi-
ture (y/n)
Total monthly expenditure (in 2005 ZAR), divided by household size.
ln (y/n), lnGw & lnGm The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of monthly household per capita expenditure (y/n), total value of women’s land grants
and total value of men’s land grants respectively.
B. Household characteristics
Number of women in household Number of resident women older than eighteen listed in the household roster.
Number of men in household Number of resident men older than eighteen listed in the household roster.
Number of children by gender and age
category
A series of variables talking on the number of resident children listed in the household roster falling within the following age-gender
groups: 0-5 year old boys, 0-5 year old girls, 6-12 year old boys, 6-12 year old girls, 13-18 year old boys, 13-18 year old girls.
Household head is a man (indicator) An indicator variable taking on the value of one if the household head is a man. Household head as identified in the household roster.
Age of household head Age (years) of household head as reported in the household roster.
Education level of household head Level of education (years of schooling) of household head as reported in the household roster.
Share of men/women with primary age
schooling
Number of resident men/women who reported having a level of education of grade two or higher, divided by number of men/women.
Used as a proxy for literacy.
Share of men/women married Number of men/women who reported being married, divided by number of resident men/women.
Share of men/women working as casual
labourers
Number of resident men/women who reported being casual laborers as their primary occupation, divided by number of resident
men/women.
Share of men/women working as wage
labourers
Number of resident men/women who reported being wage labourers as their primary occupation, divided by number of resident
men/women.
Share of men/women self employed Number of resident men/women who reported being self employed as their primary occupation, divided by number of resident
men/women.
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Table 14 continued: Variable descriptions
Mean farming experience (years) Derived from responses to household roster question: How many years of farming does [individual] have? Taken as mean of number
of years for adult household members. Missing values recoded as zero.
Mud floor (indicator) An indicator variable taking on the value of one if the household’s current dwelling has a mud floor. In the case of post-transfer
households, this is based on their status prior to transfer. In the case of a pre-transfer households, this based on their current status.
Own homestead (indicator) An indicator variable taking on the value of one if the household reported owning the dwelling in which members reside. In the case
of post-transfer households, this is based on their status prior to transfer. In the case of a pre-transfer households, this based on
their current status.
Language of interview Categorical variable for the language in which interview is conducted, as reported in the administration section of the survey.
Recorded by the interviewer .
Date of interview The date of interview, as recorded by the interviewer. Expressed as days between date of interview and Jan1, 1960
Province Categorical variable for the province where household is located as reported in administration section of survey. Recorded by
interviewer
C. Land project characteristics
Application date Imputed from response to question: When did individual apply for a grant from the DLA? Answer given in month/year format.
Application date for the household set as median application date of individual applicants in the household. Expressed as number of
days between application date and 1st Jan, 1960.
Application year Year reported from response to question: When did individual apply for a grant from the DLA? Answer given in month/year format.
Number of grant applicant men/women Number of men/women in the household who applied for a grant. Individual considered a grant applicant where there is 1) a land
grant application date and 2) a non-zero grant value reported for individual in household roster.
Heard about program from government Indicator taking on the value of one if the household reported hearing about LRAD through a representative of the DLA or another
government official
Tools contributed The estimated value (in 2005 ZAR) of the agricultural tools and equipment contributed to the LRAD project.
Animals contributed (indicator) An indicator taking on the value of one if animals and livestock were contributed to the LRAD project.
Matched amount (indicator) Indicator taking on the value of one if the household made a matching contribution for the grant amount in cash, rather than in
kind or in labour.
Moved to site (indicator) Indicator taking on the value of one if the household moved to be part of the project.
Distance to DLA office Straight line distance between site of interview at project site and nearest DLA office. GPS coordinates captured by interviewer.
Note - Table presents descriptions of key variables used in analysis. All variables are constructed from responses to the household questionnaire of the 2005 Quality of Life
survey. Sections B and C contain characteristics that are controlled for in all SUR and 3SLS estimations of the household demand system.
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